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Abstract: By providing the first comprehensive account of the role of the British and 
Indian press in war propaganda, this article makes an intervention in the global history 
of the First World War. The positive propaganda early in the war interlaced with a 
rhetoric of loyalism was in contrast with how the conservative British press affixed 
blame for military defeats in Mesopotamia upon the colonial regime’s failure to 
effectively mobilize India’s resources. Using a highly emotive and enduring trope of 
the ‘Mesopotamia muddle’, the Northcliffe press was successful in channelling a high 
degree of public scrutiny onto the campaign. The effectiveness of this criticism 
ensured that debates about the Mesopotamian debacle became a vehicle for registering 
criticism of structures of colonial rule and control in India. On the one hand this 
critique hastened constitutional reforms and devolution in colonial India, on the other 
it led to the demand that the inadequacy of India’s contribution to the war be remedied 
by raising war loans. Both the colonial government and its nationalist critics were 
briefly and paradoxically united in opposing these demands. The coercive extraction 
of funds for the imperial war effort as well as the British press’s vituperative criticism 
contributed to a postwar anti-colonial political upsurge. The procedure of creating a 
colonial ‘scandal’ out of a military disaster required a specific politics for assessing 
the regulated flows of information which proved to be highly effective in shaping both 
the enquiry that followed and the politics of interwar colonial South Asia. 
 
 
Empire and India loomed large in British First World War propaganda and in news 
reports early in the war. The mobilization of the Indian standing army – the largest in 
the empire – to fight on the Western Front within months of the declaration of war 
was celebrated as the empire rallying to the British cause. The news coverage replete 
with positive stories of colonial troops was used in war propaganda in both Britain and 
India to extract manpower and resources while managing the potential threat of 
 
1 The authors would particularly like to thank Biswamoy Pati, Mark Harrison, Ravia Ahuja, Heike 
Liebau, Chris Andreas and Sabine Lee for their encouragement and feedback on various drafts of this 
article. 
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political disaffection. Yet, merely a year and a half later the euphoria accompanying 
the initial mobilization from India had been replaced by news of the parsimony of the 
colonial Indian government was now held responsible for the ignominious collapse of 
the Mesopotamian campaign. Rebuking the powers that be, Rudyard Kipling, whose 
pen had celebrated the empire, captured the popular mood as he condemned 
incompetent colonial officials in leaving soldiers ‘thriftily to die in their own dung…/ 
… strong men coldly slain/ In sight of help denied from day to day’.
2
 The 
conservative British press, which had generously praised the material support 
extended by Indian princely rulers at the outset of the war had by 1917 begun to 
loudly question whether India had done enough for the war effort.  
Historians documenting Indian participation in the First World War tend to focus on 
the early positive propaganda but not the later disenchantment, even though a greater 
number of Indian soldiers and Indian resources were committed to the Mesopotamian 
campaign and the political fallout of the ‘scandal’ of the medical breakdown there had 
more important consequences for Indian society and politics. This lacuna exists 
despite the importance of analysing the press’s war propaganda given that 
newspapers’ influence in Britain was at its peak during this period.
34
 In analysing this 
sharp turn in the British press’s coverage of colonial India during the First World War, 
this article brings together several distinct historiographies – of First World War 
propaganda in Britain and India, of the Mesopotamian campaign and of the role of the 
British press in imperial politics.  
 
2
 Kipling’s poem ‘Mesopotamia’, was published simultaneously in both the Morning Post and the New 
York Times. Rudyard Kipling, ‘Mesopotamia’, Morning Post, 11 Jul. 1917, p. 6. 
3
 Troy Paddock, ‘Introduction: Newspapers, Public Opinion, and Propaganda’, Call to Arms, Paddock 
(ed.), pp. 4-13. 
4
 Haste, Keep the Home Fires, p. 21. Also see Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 2-10. The 
distinction between ‘published opinion’ as distinct from ‘public opinion’ and the interplay between the 
two has been emphasised in more recent scholarship. See Adrian Gregory, ‘A Clash of Cultures: The 
British Press and the Opening of the Great War’, Call to Arms, Paddock (ed.), pp. 15-49. 
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By bringing into focus the link between British and Indian political developments, 
this article makes a significant intervention in understanding the impact of the First 
World War on colonial Indian history and to the global history of the war. National 
historiographies exclude certain topics and marginalize the role of transnational 
influences in shaping social, economic and political developments. The protestations 
of imperial loyalty during the war sit very uneasily with narratives of Indian history 
which privilege the development of anti-colonial critiques of colonial rule and 
imperial exploitation. This has contributed to the neglect of the history of Indian 
participation in the First World War.
5
 This article will place both British and Indian 
histories during the First World War within a broader international frame of analysis 
so that the impact of imperialism on colonial governance and economic structures of 
India can be better understood.  
Beginning with a review of existing historiographies on press and propaganda 
during the First World War, we examine initial news coverage in 1914-15 which 
emphasized colonial India’s generous contributions to the British war effort and 
meticulous arrangements made to safeguard the ethnic practices of Indian sepoys
6
 
within an imperial ‘partnership’. The publicly expressed loyalty to the imperial cause 
was invested with a particularly forceful meaning by Indian elites eager to share in a 
wider, shared discourse of loyalism. The second section analyses the meanings of 
Indian elites’ loyalty which arose from notions of Britishness emphasising a shared 
British culture. By the summer of 1916, as news of the military and medical 
breakdown in Mesopotamia percolated through the British press, recrimination against 
colonial parsimony had replaced the earlier mood of public euphoria. The third section 
 
5
 Santanu Das, ‘Ardour and Anxiety: Politics and Literature in the Indian Homefront’, in The World in 
World Wars: Experiences, Perceptions and Perspectives from Africa and Asia, Heike Liebau, et al. 
(eds.), Brill, Leiden, 2010, p. 342.  
6
 The term ‘sepoy’ was a corruption of the word ‘sipahi’ and referred to an Indian soldier in British 
employ. 
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analyses the leading role played by the Northcliffe press in making public the 
scandalous neglect of sick and wounded soldiers on the Mesopotamian front. It 
examines the conservative British press’s denunciation of the colonial Indian 
government for causing the breakdown and the increasingly vociferous criticism of the 
inadequacy of the Indian contribution to the imperial war effort. The intensity of this 
criticism was in such marked contrast to an earlier public rhetoric of loyalty and 
service to the imperial cause that it particularly energized conservative public opinion 
into questioning colonial loyalism. The Northcliffe press was especially influential in 
instigating parliamentary scrutiny of the breakdown and shaping the Commission 
which was appointed to investigate the military debacle. As the fourth section shows, 
the public discussion of Indian finances in relation to the war effort revealed imperial 
fault lines – while the British press criticized the failure of the Indian government to 
pour its economic resources unstintingly into the war effort, the Indian nationalist 
press decried such demands. This article explains how British conservative criticism 
of the Mesopotamian breakdown directly led to an increase in India’s material 
contribution to the war, and the imposition of a war loan. It argues that not only did 
this cause the appeal of imperial loyalism to vane, it fuelled a more critical anti-
colonial nationalism driven by the economic impact of the war loan and the political 
repression of war time measures. 
Debating a World at War 
To understand the complex and interlocking historiographies that frame this article, 
we begin here by considering how the story of Indian anti-colonial nationalism has 
dominated the study of modern Indian history. The study of the First World War has 
focused on key political episodes during the war – the unification of the ‘moderate’ 
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and ‘extremist’ factions of the Indian National Congress (1915-1916), the coming 
together of the Congress and the Muslim League under the Lahore Pact of 1916 and 
the initiation of the Home Rule Leagues in the same year, which called for dominion 
status for India.
7
 The Ghadar movement (1915) and introduction of the Montague-
Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, which deepened devolution and expanded 
representational bodies have also been of considerable interest to historians because of 
their political implications for the rise of nationalism.
8
 These larger narratives do not 
examine the impact of the war on India as a ‘home front’,
9
 but rather, focus instead on 
tracing the causal roots of the popular upsurge in post-war nationalist movements to 
the economic hardship produced by the war. The economic impact of the war has been 
interpreted largely in terms of increasing inflation, the imposition of heavy taxes, the 
adverse impact of the colonial monetary policy on India, industrial expansion resulting 
from war-time shortages and labour unrest, and the post-war slump of the Indian 
economy.
10
 This scholarship focuses on the coercion that marked large scale 
recruitment of soldiers in the rural hinterland
11
 and assumes that  economic 
 
7
 For useful overviews of political developments during the war, see Sumit Sarkar, Modern India, 1885-
1947, Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1995, pp. 147-53; Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South 
Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 102-5; Bipan 
Chandra, et. al, India’s struggle for independence, 1857-1947, New Delhi: Viking, 1988, pp. 159-69. 
8
 For new work on the Ghadar movement see Seema Sohi, Echoes of Mutiny: Race, Surveillance, and 
Indian Anticolonialism in North America, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014; and Maia Ramnath, 
Haj to Utopia: How the Ghadar Movement Charted Global Radicalism and Attempted to Overthrow 
the British Empire, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2011. For the politics surrounding the 
Government of India Act of 1919, see Peter Robb, The Government of India and Reform: Policies 
towards Politics and the Constitution, 1916-1921, Oxford: OUP, 1976. 
9
 Dewitt Ellinwood and S. D. Pradhan (eds.), India and World War I, Manohar, Delhi, 1978, serves as a 
dated exception to this trend, but also see below. 
10
 Amiya Kumar Bagchi, ‘Indian Economy and Society during World War One’, Social Scientist, vol. 
42, nos. 7/8, 2014, pp. 12-16; Krishan Saini, ‘The economic aspects of India’s participation in the First 
World War’, in DeWitt and Pradhan, ed., India and World War I, pp. 141-76. Bose and Jalal, Modern 
South Asia, pp. 127-8. 
11
 An exceptional look at the Punjab as a home front through two world wars can be found in Tan Tai 
Yong, The Garrison State: the military, government and society in colonial Punjab 1849-1941, 
Manohar, New Delhi, 2005. Other works which consider the impact of manpower mobilization for 
these wars are Rajit Mazumder, The Indian Army and the making of Punjab, Permanent Black, Delhi, 
2003; David Omissi (ed.), Indian Voices of the Great War, 1914-1918, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1999. 
For an argument of the recruitment of Indian soldiers as cannon fodder for an imperial cause is Susan 
Page 5 of 56
Cambridge University Press
Modern Asian Studies
For Review Only
6 
 
 
dislocations caused by the war fed nationalist resistance during the Rowlatt 
Satyagraha (1919) and the Non-Cooperation Movement (1921-2).
12
 Despite the 
importance of the two Indian war loans raised through coercion in contributing to 
popular political mobilization, little is known about how they came to be imposed 
upon India. Historians mistakenly locate the war loans as the necessary outcome of the 
rise in Indian national debt consequent on increased military expenditure during the 
war.
13
 Instead, this article argues that the imposition of the war loans was a response 
by the colonial state to the conservative British press calling into question the value of 
India’s contribution to the imperial war effort.  
A renewed interest in the global dimensions of the First World War has contributed 
to a re-examination of the war from the vantage point of non-European participants in 
the conflict, including those from colonial South Asia.
14
 However, as yet, no 
systematic attempt has been made to examine how India figured in press coverage of 
the war and propaganda – an especially serious omission given its far-reaching 
implications for political developments in India. Also neglected is the important role 
                                                                                                                                       
VanKoski, ‘The Indian Ex-Soldier from the Eve of the First World War to Independence and Partition’, 
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1996. 
12
 Sarkar, Modern India, p. 168-77, Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, From Plassey to Partition: A History of 
Modern India, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2004, pp. 286-88. 
13
 Sarkar, Modern India, p. 169. 
14
 See especially Heike Liebau, et al. (eds), The World in World Wars; Franziska Roy, Heike Liebau 
and Ravi Ahuja (eds), When the War Began We Heard of Several Kings: South Asian Prisoners in 
World War I Germany, Social Science Press, Brill, 2011; Helmut Bley and Anorthe Kremers (eds), The 
World during the First World War: Perceptions, Experiences and Consequences, Klartext, Essen, 2014; 
Santanu Das (ed.), Race, Empire and First World War writing, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2013. Among important older contributions are, Rozina Visram, Asians in Britain, Pluto 
Press, London, 2002; Jeffery Greenhut, ‘The Imperial Reserve: the Indian Corps on the Western Front, 
1914-1915’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 12 (1983), 54-73. Some of the growing 
literature on Indians in the First World War tends to reproduce the imperial or ethnocentric biases of 
military authorities and other official sources. See for instance, Andrew Jarboe and Richard S. Fogarty, 
(eds), Empires in World War I: shifting frontiers and imperial dynamics in a global conflict, I.B.Tauris, 
London, 2014; Gordon Corrigan, Sepoys in the Trenches: The Indian Corps on the Western Front 1914-
1915, Spellmount, Staplehurst, 1999, G. M. Jack, ‘The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914-1915: 
A Portrait of Collaboration’, War in History, 2006, 13, 329-62. There are numerous military histories of 
Indian participation in the First World War, which ignore the larger political context and social impact 
of the war in India and will not be discussed here. See for example, Kaushik Roy (ed.), The Indian 
Army in the Two World Wars, Brill, Leiden, 2011. 
Page 6 of 56
Cambridge University Press
Modern Asian Studies
For Review Only
7 
 
 
that the British press played in exposing the medical breakdown in the Mesopotamian 
campaign and its impact on colonial governance.
15
 The history of the press in colonial 
India and in the settler colonies discusses the period of the First World War only in 
passing.
16
 Chandrika Kaul’s discussion of the censorship of the Indian press and the 
use of British newspapers for First World War propaganda by the India Office forms a 
notable exception.
17
 Simon Potter’s history of the imperial news system, which 
examines the relationship of news agencies from the settler colonies with the British 
government shows that they facilitated news censorship in the settler colonies to 
maintain morale and boost contribution to the imperial war effort.
18
  Historians of 
South Asia interested in reconstructing the home front in major Indian recruiting 
regions have used news reports as sources, but without adequate attention to press 
censorship or the use of the press in war propaganda. Although the experience of 
Indian soldiers in British war hospitals has received some attention, their use in war 
propaganda has not been adequately examined.
19
 This article examines more closely 
 
15
 Ravi Ahuja refers in passing to news reports and the circulation of rumours about the war in his ‘The 
Corrosiveness of Comparison: Reverberations of Indian Wartime Experiences in German Prison 
Camps, 1915-19’, in World in World Wars, pp. 135, 139-43; Yong, Garrison State, pp. 105, 184, 233-4. 
Although Andrew Jarboe examines how the mobilization of Indian soldiers in the service of empire 
figured in First World War imperial propaganda, his study is limited to the Western Front and ignores 
the obvious, though unexamined significance of such metropolitan efforts for colonial politics. Andrew 
Jarboe, ‘Soldiers of Empire: “Colonial Troops” in the Imperial Metropole and Imperial Propaganda, 
1914-18’, Propaganda in the First World War, Troy Paddock (ed.), Brill, Leiden, 2012. The limited 
scope of this analysis is undermined by the frequent reliance on uncritical blanket terms such as 
‘racism’ to characterize representations of Sepoys in British newspapers. 
16 For a recent reassessment of the politics and mechanics of colonial news gathering in nineteenth-
century India, see Amelia Bonea, The News of Empire: Telegraphy, Journalism and the Politics of 
Reporting in Colonial India, c. 1830-1900, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2016, pp. 149-321. 
17
 Chandrika Kaul, Reporting the Raj: the British Press and India, c.1880–1922, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2003, pp. 119-34. Northcliffe’s imperial vision and its reflection in the newspapers 
he owned is examined in Chandrika Kaul, ‘Popular Press and Empire: Northcliffe, India and the Daily 
Mail, 1896-1922’, in Northcliffe’s Legacy: Aspects of the British Popular Press, 1896-1996, Peter 
Catterall, et al., (eds), Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000, pp. 45-69. 
18 Simon Potter, News and the British World: the Emergence of an Imperial Press System, 1876-1922, 
Clarendon, Oxford, 2003. 
19
 Mark Harrison’s The Medical War: British Military Medicine in the First World War, OUP, Oxford, 
2010, is an excellent survey of the role of medical services in the First World War, which is attentive to 
experiences of Indian soldiers. See also his ‘Disease, Discipline and Dissent: The Indian Army in 
France and England, 1914-15’, in Medicine and Modern Warfare, Roger Cooter, Mark Harrison and 
Steve Sturdy (eds), Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1999. Indian soldiers’ war hospitals in Britain are placed 
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how India was used in war propaganda by the British press. In doing so, it analyses 
the imperial loyalism of the early war effort and shows that the exposé of the Indian 
government’s role in causing the Mesopotamian medical breakdown by the 
Northcliffe press led to important political consequences in India.  
Despite greater and longer involvement of Indian soldiers on the Mesopotamian and 
East African fronts, the literature on India and the First World War has largely focused 
on the Western Front.
20
 Since the colonial Indian state nourished sub-imperialist 
ambitions in West Asia and East Africa, these campaigns were also politically 
significant.
21
 Historians who have examined the Mesopotamia campaign have tended 
to focus on operational or military histories.
22
 The impact of the Mesopotamia 
Commission, which condemned the Indian government’s prosecution of the war in 
West Asia has received some attention, with historians tending to re-examine the 
conclusions of the Commission and whether or not its condemnation of actors in India 
                                                                                                                                       
within a longer historical trajectory of debates on state funding for medical care for Sepoys by 
Samiksha Sehrawat, Colonial Medical Care in North India: Gender, State and Society, c. 1830-1920, 
Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2013. Among older narratives of these hospitals see Visram, 
Asians in Britain, pp. 113-43. Recent accounts not informed by a critical engagement with or 
understanding of Indian history include Samuel Hyson and Alan Lester, ‘“British India on trial”: 
Brighton military Hospitals and the politics of empire in World War I’, Journal of Historical 
Geography, 38 (1), 2012, pp. 18-34; and Andrew Jarboe, ‘Healing the Empire: Indian Hospitals in 
Britain and France during the First World War’, Twentieth Century British History, vol. 26, no. 3, 2015, 
pp. 347-69. 
20 Notable exceptions are Mark Harrison, ‘The Fight Against Disease in the Mesopotamian Campaign’, 
in Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced, Peter Liddle and Hugh Cecil (eds.), Leo 
Cooper, Barnsley, 1996, pp. 475-89; Harrison, Medical War, Santanu Das, ‘Indians at home, 
Mesopotamia and France, 1914-1918’, in Race, Empire and First World War, Das (ed.), pp. 70-89; 
Sehrawat, Colonial Medical Care; Pradhan and Ellinwood, India and WWI; S.D. Pradhan, Indian Army 
in East Africa, 1914-1918, National Book Organisation, New Delhi, 1991; James E. Kitchen, The 
British Imperial Army in the Middle East: Morale and Military Identity in the Sinai and Palestine 
Campaigns, 1916-18, London: Bloomsbury 2014; and; Brian Robson, Crisis on the Frontier: the Third 
Afghan War and the campaign in Waziristan 1919-1920, Spellmount, Stroud, 2007. 
21
 See, for instance, David French, ‘The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut: Prestige as a Factor in British 
Eastern Strategy, 1914-1916’, War & Society, vol. 5, no. 1, (1987); V. H. Rothwell, ‘Mesopotamia in 
British War Aims, 1914-1918’, Historical Journal, vol. 13, no. 2, (1970), pp. 273-94. S. Cohen, ‘The 
Genesis of the British Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, (1976), 
pp. 119-32. On Indian sub-imperialism see, Robert Blyth, The Empire of the Raj: India, Eastern Africa 
and the Middle East, 1858-1947, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003. 
22
 See for instance, A. J. Barker, The Neglected War: Mesopotamia 1914-1918, Faber and Faber, 
London, 1967; Paul K. Davis, Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian Campaign and 
Commission, Associated University Presses, Madison, 1994; and Paul Knight, The British Army in 
Mesopotamia, 1914-1918, McFarland, Jefferson, 2013. 
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was politically motivated.
23
 Such re-examinations of the politics of the Commission 
would be more useful if they did not focus merely on British politics but also paid 
attention to political developments in India.  
The tendency to view the history of the British press during the First World War 
within a national frame has obscured the entanglement of British newspapers with the 
British Empire. The wartime censorship of the British press and the rising influence of 
press barons such as Northcliffe have been important themes in this domestic history 
of the British press during an imperial war.
24
 The historiography of the British press 
during the war does not examine how the British press perceived and portrayed 
colonial India’s contribution to the war effort. The history of British First World War 
propaganda has a similar blind spot towards the empire, focusing on the activities of 
Wellington House, Beaverbrook’s role in war propaganda and on propaganda in 
neutral countries and the British home front.
25
 An analysis of news coverage of 
colonial India is useful in understanding how the empire was presented to the British 
public during the war.
26
 Propaganda on the home front focused on justifying Britain’s 
role in the war by drawing on a language of patriotism, on maintaining recruitment 
and civilian morale and on black propaganda against Germany. The use of propaganda 
 
23
 See, for example, Douglas Goold, ‘Lord Hardinge and the Mesopotamia Expedition and Inquiry, 
1914–1917’, Historical Journal, 1976, vol. 19 (4), pp. 919-45. Barker argues that the Mesopotamia 
Commission report was politically motivated. See Barker, The Neglected War; Davis, End and Means 
and discussion below. A more recent instalment to this approach is Kristian Ulrichsen, The logistics and 
politics of the British campaigns in the Middle East, 1914-22, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2010, 
esp. pp. 22-3.  
24
 Deian Hopkin, ‘Domestic Censorship in the First World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 
5, no. 4. (1970), pp. 151-69; J. M. McEwen, ‘The Press and the Fall of Asquith’, Historical Journal, 
vol. 21, (1978); J. Lee Thompson, ‘Fleet Street Colossus: The Rise and Fall of Northcliffe, 1896- 
1922’, Parliamentary History, vol. 25(1), 2006, pp.115-38.  
25
 David Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda in First World War Britain: The National War Aims 
Committee and Civilian Morale, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 2013; M.L. Sanders and Philip 
M. Taylor, British propaganda during the First World War 1914-1918, Macmillan, London, 1982; 
Gary Messinger, British propaganda and the state in the First World War, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 1992; Cate Haste, Keep the home fires burning : propaganda in the First World 
War, Allen Lane, London, 1977; Peter Buitenhuis, The Great War of Words: Literature as Propaganda, 
1914-18 and After, UCB Press, Vancouver, 1987. 
26
 Paddock, ‘Introduction: Newspapers, Public Opinion, and Propaganda’, pp. 4-13. 
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to create sympathy and support for Britain in neutral countries has received much 
attention, but only passing mention is made in this historiography to propaganda about 
or in the empire despite its importance to the war effort. This article focuses attention 
on the British press’s role in creating positive imperial war propaganda through 
reiteration of Indian loyalty, India’s enthusiastic contribution to the war effort in the 
early phases of the war and about Indian soldiers on the Western Front. News agencies 
such as Reuters cooperated clandestinely with the British government, which used 
Reuters’ networks to distribute propaganda within the empire and control the flow of 
news to the colonies during the war.
27
 This article provides a detailed examination of 
British press coverage of India’s participation in the First World War from a wide 
political spectrum. It focuses not only on war propaganda by the imperially minded 
newspapers of the Northcliffe press and prominent liberal papers but also news reports 
from a range of lesser known papers such as right-wing Daily Express and the popular 
radical working-class evening daily, Star. While the focus of current articles on India 
in British war propaganda remains on early phases of the war which stressed the 
loyalty of India to the British Empire, this article shows for the first time the important 
role played by the Northcliffe press in breaking this early consensus to report on the 
medical breakdown in the Mesopotamian campaign. Similarly, the historiography of 
British politics during the First World War acknowledges the significance of press 
intervention in politics during the war, especially in the reconfigurations of H.H. 
Asquith’s government in 1915 and 1916 and on Lloyd George’s manipulation of the 
press, but is oblivious to the imperial implications of this politics.
28
 This article shows 
conclusively that the focus on the Mesopotamia scandals was an important part of the 
 
27
 Potter, News and the British World; Kaul, Reporting the Raj, p. 130-2. 
28
 Asquith was the British prime minister from 1908 and was forced to resign in December 1916 amid 
allegations of poor management of the war. McEwen, ‘Fall of Asquith’, J. M. McEwen, ‘Northcliffe 
and Lloyd George at War, 1914-1918’, Historical Journal, vol. 24, (1981); Martin Pugh, Lloyd George, 
Longman, London, 1988. 
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attacks on the Asquith government by conservative British newspapers such as the 
Times, the Daily Mail and the Morning Post. While newspapers of all political 
spectrums were critical of the highest levels of the British administration in India after 
the exposé of the medical breakdown in Mesopotamia, news coverage varied 
considerably according to political leanings. Thus, the Manchester Guardian sought to 
use this indictment of colonial governance to promote devolution of power in India in 
keeping with liberal principles. Although the Northcliffe press had muted its negative 
coverage of the colonial Indian government after the Mesopotamia Commission 
Report, the Morning Post continued in its acerbic criticism till it had forced the 
colonial government to commit to making further contributions to the imperial war 
effort by raising ill-advised war loans in India. In focusing on the British press, the 
intention here is not to restore an older imperial historiography which treated political 
developments in Indian history as outgrowths of British political ideologies and 
influences. Indeed, press coverage of Indian finances shows the disproportionate 
influence exercised by the British press in shaping colonial  policy. While the British 
press’s criticism of the colonial state as a rigid bureaucracy hastened constitutional 
reform, its shrill demands for greater extraction of Indian economic resources imposed 
two war loans on a colony which was witnessing what has been called a ‘massive 
plunder of Indian human and material resources’ during the war.
29
 On the other hand, 
the Indian press was heavily censored and its protests against the severity of coercion 
during drives to raise funds for the imperial war effort ignored. 
The next section discusses how India and Indian soldiers on the Western front were 
portrayed in early war propaganda by the British press. This delves deeper into the 
nature of war propaganda relating to India by juxtaposing its various aspects– the  
 
29
 Sarkar, Modern India, p. 169. 
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celebration of Indian soldiers’ valour, the military and financial aid rendered by the 
colonial Indian state and its allies the princely rulers, the meanings of imperial loyalty 
in the early stretches of the war, the role of medical arrangements for sepoys in 
boosting propaganda, the prominence in the British press’s coverage of the ethnic 
customs of Indian soldiers, imperial anxieties regarding Muslim colonial soldiers and 
regarding miscegenation from the proximity of Indian soldiers with white women. In 
providing an overview of these developments, this article argues that the effusive 
celebration of Indian loyalty was to ironically provide the ballast for concerted 
criticism of colonial Indian governance as later news coverage in the conservative 
British press harped on about India’s failure to adequately contribute to the imperial 
war effort. 
Indian Loyalty on the Western Front: Press and War Propaganda 
By September 1914 Indian soldiers were dispatched to France to fight on the 
beleaguered Western front. They were deployed less than two months after the 
outbreak of hostilities at a time when there were no other standing armies within the 
British Empire to supplement the heavily depleted British forces at the front. Indian 
sepoys therefore gained high visibility in the British press.
30
 The colonial state was 
keen to manage the flow of information about Indian soldiers and the war in India. 
Therefore, before discussing the positive propaganda regarding Indian soldiers, it is 
important to acknowledge the use of censorship to manage the flow of information to 
 
30 Much was made of the pageantry associated with the arrival of the Expeditionary Force at Marseilles, 
‘Indian Troops in France’, The Times, 2 Oct. 1914, p. 9.The editorial described ‘the little Gurkhas 
playing the “Marseillaise”…on the little bagpipes which their good comrades in the Highland regiments 
taught them…the great French tune sounding from the Highland pipes played by the Indian 
Highlanders…the Indian warriors are India’s answer to the great German miscalculation about Indian 
fidelity’, ‘What We Think: Our Indian Army’, Star, 2 Oct. 1914, p. 2; ‘Soldiers of India’, The Times, 3 
Oct. 1914, p. 7.  
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India about the war.
31
 Telegraph censorship and the Indian chief censor controlled 
news sent to India about the war, even from British newspapers. Reuters was also used 
by the India Office to provide positive publicity for the Indian effort and suppressing 
news considered inimical to British rule in India.
32
 As Kaul points out, censorship in 
India was distinct from censorship in Britain and the dominions since the Indian 
government had a long-established tradition of controlling the press through punitive 
legislation embodied in successive Press Acts, censorship and emergency powers and 
the imperial control of news reporting through explicit restrictions on access to 
information in India.
33
 The colonial state recognized that ‘prompt dissemination of 
accurate war news in the Dependency is of great importance’ due to the ‘rapidity with 
which wild rumours are spread among the Indian populace’, and the possibility of 
German spies influencing the rumours circulating in India.
34
 To facilitate this, Francis 
Younghusband was appointed to the India Office in 1914 to prepare telegrams with 
news regarding the war for distribution to Indian newspapers by the Indian 
government.  Since British newspapers were perceived to be faithfully reflective of 
British public opinion by Indians and could reach Indian soldiers on the Western 
Front, the India Office sought to influence British news coverage on Indian matters by 
promoting news stories that celebrated Indian support for the war and downplaying 
threats to the security of the empire. Some of this was achieved through informal 
 
31
 Kaul, Reporting the Raj, pp. 123-5. For censorship on the western front see Visram, Ayahs, Lascars, 
p. 123.  
32 Kaul, Reporting the Raj, pp. 125-6, 130.  
33
 Chandrika Kaul, ‘India, the Imperial Press Conferences and the Empire Press Union: The Diplomacy 
of News in the Politics of Empire, 1909-46’, Media and the British Empire, Chandrika Kaul (ed.), 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, esp. pp. 135-6; N.G. Barrier, Banned: Controversial Literature 
and Political Control in British India, 1907-47, Columbia, University of Missouri Press,1974, esp. 66-
107. Potter argues that the widening of state censorship during and after the war in India was in sharp 
contrast with the wider trend of the flow of information with limited government intervention across the 
British Empire, especially in the Dominion colonies, Potter, News and the British World, p. 206.  
34 ‘News for India: Sir F. Younghusband’s Daily Telegrams’, The Times, 8 Feb. 1915, p. 6. 
Younghusband had established a reputation in the pre-war period for his knowledge about foreign 
policy and his travels in central Asia, especially Tibet during the era of the ‘Great Game’. 
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contacts between Austen Chamberlain (secretary of state for India, May 1915-July 
1917), leading British journalists and the two Indian viceroys who served during the 
war – Lord Hardinge (1910-16) and Lord Chelmsford (1916-1921).
35
 
In the opening months of the war, the British press therefore presented Indian 
soldiers positively as loyal subjects who had gallantly come to the rescue of the 
British Empire in its time of need.
36
 The British press had been largely supportive of 
the war and had enthusiastically conducted positive propaganda in support of war 
aims, to keep up recruitment and civilian morale.
37
 As Kaul points out, the India 
Office was also keen to ensure ‘a steady flow of favourable news’ at the beginning of 
the war.
38
 News of Indian soldiers was a popular item in British newspapers during 
this early phase and the India Office sought to ‘guide’ news coverage through the 
appointment of F. E. Smith as a representative of the Indian press on the Western front 
in 1914. In his reports, Smith privileged stories of heroic achievement of the Indian 
army over those of high casualties.
39
 Offers of service and gifts for the war effort from 
Indian princely rulers, from the Indian government and from nationalist politicians 
who were deemed to ‘speak for native India as a whole’ were interpreted as proof that 
India, like the British settler colonies, gave its consent to British imperial rule.
40
 
Contributions to the war effort by India were seen as evidence that the British Empire 
 
35 Kaul, Reporting the Raj, pp. 126, 132. 
36
 ‘The Swords of India’, Daily Chronicle, 2 Sep. 1914, p. 4; ‘India’s 70,000: Troops “Already 
Dispatched,” Says Viceroy’, Star, 9 Sep. 1914, 1; ‘Our Indian Army in France’, Daily Mail, 2 Oct. 
1914, p. 4. 
37 Haste, Keep the Home Fires; Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda. 
38
 Kaul, Reporting the Raj, pp. 125-6. For the India Office’s war propaganda, also see Visram, Ayahs, 
Lascars, pp. 125-9. 
39
 Ibid., p. 125. Created Baron Birkenhead in 1919, Smith was appointed a ‘recording officer’ while he 
served as a staff officer with the Indian corps. He was to later co-author an official history entitled The 
Indian Corps in France (London: John Murray, 1917) with his successor, JWB Merewether. 
40
 ‘The Empire’s Devotion’, Manchester Guardian, 14 Aug. 1914; ‘Enthusiastic Evidences of 
Patriotism’ and ‘Loyalty of Native Opinion’, Morning Post, 9 Sep. 1914, p. 8; ‘India’s Princely Aid: 
The Gorgeous East in Fee’, The Times, 10 Aug. 1914, p. 9; ‘India and Her Army: Eagerness to Serve in 
Europe’, The Times, 31 Aug. 1914, p. 7; ‘India’s Martial Spirit’, The Times, 13 Nov. 1914, p. 7; ‘Rajput 
Fighting Princes’, The Times, 8 Jan. 1915, p.3. See also, Das, ‘Ardour and Anxiety’. 
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continued to enjoy popular support amongst its South Asian subjects.
41
  The Punch  
concluded that this support was a direct result of the British civilizing mission’s 
purported claims to ‘improve’ colonial society: 
They’re proud to share the Empire-pride. 
It’s them for Britain at the test; 
We knew they’d never stand aside; 
For when we tried and did our best 
The beggars must have known we tried.
42
 
Such portrayals were fairly representative and reinforced British home front 
propaganda that the Allied cause was just and moral.
43
 Calls for recruitment exhorted 
men from Britain and the empire to do their duty for King, country and empire.
44
  
Newspapers proclaimed that offers of service, men and material for the war from India 
testified to the popularity of British imperial rule, being material demonstrations of 
Indian ‘loyalty’ and the desire of Indian subjects to serve the Empire.
45
 Messages by 
nationalist Indian politicians in the Legislative Council asserted the righteousness of 
the British cause, reiterated that India’s contribution was a demonstration of its duty 
 
41
 ‘The Empire’s Devotion’, Manchester Guardian, 14 Aug. 1914, ‘India’s 70,000: Troops “Already 
Dispatched,” Says Viceroy’, Star, 9 Sep. 1914, p. 1; ‘India’s Enthusiasm: Proposal to Share War Cost 
with United Kingdom’, Star, 10 Sep. 1914, p. 1 
42 ‘India: 1784-1914’, Punch, or the London Charivari, vol. 147, 7 Oct. 1914. 
43
 That Britain was fighting in defence of the principle of ‘Right against Might’ in defence of small 
nations was a cornerstone of British propaganda on the home front and in neutral countries. Haste, Keep 
the Home Fires, p. 52, 57, 63; Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda, pp. 159-62. ‘Britain’s Just Cause’, 
The Times, 7 Aug. 1914, p. 7. R.E. Vernede reminded the Sepoys that ‘all that they [the German 
enemy] had of izzat [sense of chivalrous honour] is trodden under heel- Into their hearts, my brothers, 
drive home, drive home the steel!’, ‘The Indian Army’, The Times, 11 Aug. 1914, p. 9. 
44
 Although Haste’s study acknowledges the importance of the empire, she does not discuss how empire 
figured in the propaganda. Monger pays attention to this when discussing supranational patriotism, but 
only in passing, Patriotism and Propaganda, pp. 89-90, 151. 
45
 ‘Our Indian Army: The Question of Colour in War Time’, Daily Chronicle, 1 Sep. 1914, p. 3; ‘The 
King’s Messages to the Empire: Gratitude and Pride; Unity in a Just Cause…Magnificent Loyalty: 
India’s Offers of Lives and Resources’, Morning Post, 10 Sep. 1914, p. 6; Valentine Chirol, ‘India and 
the War: the Depth of National Feeling’, The Times, 12 Sep. 1914, p. 9; ‘The Response of India: Lord 
Curzon on Imperial Unity’, The Times, 7 Oct. 1914, p. 10. 
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and gratitude to Empire.
46
 It is important to link such protestations with conceptions of 
imperial patriotism and citizenship if we are not to dismiss all evidence of Indian 
cooperation with the British during colonial rule as ‘collaboration’, with all its 
negative connotations. This article thus initiates a closer examination of ‘imperial 
loyalism’ in colonial India.
47
 Viceroy Hardinge had deployed Indian soldiers to France 
in the hope of pandering to Indian notions of ‘parity’ with Europeans and to foster 
enthusiasm and support for the war in India.
48
 Responding to this gesture, Nationalist 
politicians in India represented Indian contribution to the war as an act of imperial 
citizenship, which was expected to be acknowledged by greater self-government after 
the war.
49
 Santanu Das, in his analysis of the effusion of Indian loyalty in publications 
associated with the early years of the war argues that it arose from an ambivalent 
‘knotting’ together of Anglicization and ‘an incipient nationalist consciousness’.
50
 
Thus, the response in India, including from nationalist leaders like M.K. Gandhi,
51
 
was a reiteration of their adoption of ideas of imperial citizenship which located 
Britishness as an identity based on a notion of a shared culture of ‘language, laws, 
 
46
 ‘India’s Splendid Rally: Offers of Service From Princes and People, “message to the Whole” World’, 
Manchester Guardian, 10 Sep. 1914; ‘India’s Enthusiasm: Proposal to Share War Cost with United 
Kingdom’, Star, 10 Sep. 1914, p. 1. 
47 Historiographically, this will involve a re-engagement with earlier interventions such as Christopher 
Bayly, ‘Returning the British to South Asian History: The Limits of Colonial Hegemony’, in The 
Origins of Nationality in India, pp. 77-8, 93, 122-3, 125, 285-6, 295, 309. 
48
 Although lip service was paid to this and some concessions were made to this war time propaganda, 
unequal treatment of Indian soldiers continued through the war. That Hardinge’s strategy worked is 
evident from the overwhelming support he received in the Indian press when he was criticized by the 
Mesopotamia Commission and heavily censured in the British press in July 1917 for his role in causing 
the Mesopotamia campaign breakdown.  
49 Thus Dadabhai Naoroji, the most prominent Moderate nationalist leader, confidently claimed, ‘We 
are above all British citizens of the great British Empire, and that is at present our greatest pride’, ‘India 
and the War: Mr Naoroji’s Confidence’, The Times, 5 Sep. 1914, p. 9. Naoroji’s qualified support can 
be contrasted with the rather effusive composition of Nawab Nizamut Jung, a retired High Court Judge, 
‘Thine equal justice, mercy, grace, Have made a distant alien race, A part of thee!’, ‘India to England’, 
The Times, 2 Sep. 1914, p. 9.   
50
 Das, ‘Ardour and Anxiety’, p. 257. 
51
 Louis Fischer, Mahatma Gandhi: His Life and Times, Harper Collins, London, 1997, pp. 202-3. 
Gandhi’s appeal to Gujarati women mirrored calls in Britain ‘Women of Britain say “Go!”’, Haste, 
Keep the Home Fires, p. 55. ‘The Indian Wounded’, Letter from M. K. Gandhi, The Times, 5 Nov. 
1914, p. 6; ‘Young India in the War’, The Times, 24 Dec. 1914, p. 6. 
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institutions, and attachment to the empire’ rather than an ethnic identity.
52
 Potter and 
Andrew Thompson have posited that this notion of Britishness was especially relevant 
to discussion of settler colonies’ relationship to Britain. Thompson’s arguments for 
reconceptualizing ‘loyalism’ in colonial South Africa apply to India before the First 
World War as well. Thompson shows that the loyalty of South Africans ought not to 
be narrowly conceptualized as loyalty to the British Government or to ‘Anglo-Saxon 
Imperialism’ but to the idea of ‘Britain’, that included a ‘generalized loyalty to a 
“British way of life”’ or ‘commitment to a certain set of “liberal” imperial values’.
53
 
Das’s findings echo Thompson’s conclusion that imperial loyalty was often 
undergirded by local patriotism and regional identities, even when they were critical 
of the economic impact of empire.
54
 Monger also argues that British patriotism during 
the First World War spoke in several registers, with a supra-national patriotism that 
overlapped with the empire.
55
  
Press portrayal emphasized how German plans to incite Indian Muslims and other 
British colonial subjects to overthrow the British Empire had come to nought.
56
 Pan-
Islamic sentiment was at the heart of German and Ottoman propaganda and aroused 
considerable anxiety among British authorities due to the large number of Muslim 
 
52 Edward Gibbon Wakefield (1829), cited in Potter, News and the British World, p. 2. 
53
 Thompson acknowledges that this rhetoric of ‘loyalty’ to the empire was in tension with local 
colonial identities, see Andrew Thompson, ‘The Languages of Loyalism in Southern Africa, c. 1870-
1939’, English Historical Review, vol. 118, no. 477, 2003, pp. 617-650. 
54 Das, ‘Ardour and Anxiety’, pp. 360-7. 
55
 Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda, pp. 24-5, 65-9. 
56
 ‘India’s Loyalty: Moslem League Urges Turkish Neutrality’, Morning Post, 9 Sep. 1914, p. 9 ; The 
Agha Khan’s speech delivered to a Indian Volunteers Committee, chaired by Gandhi, was quoted 
widely in the metropolitan press, ‘India’s Loyal Aid in the War, Germany as the Enemy of Moslem 
Nations’, The Times, 2 Oct. 1914, p. 9; ‘India: 1784-1914’, Punch, or the London Charivari, vol. 147, 7 
Oct. 1914; ‘Feeling in India: Moslem Press Warns Turkey…Loyalty to the British Raj’, Morning Post, 
3 Nov. 1914, p. 8; ‘Curse from the Mountains: Old Indian Hunter on Our Enemy’, Daily Mail, 10 Nov. 
1914, p. 8; ‘Indian Moslem Loyalty’, The Times, 12 Nov. 1914, p. 7; ‘Indian Troops at the Front’, The 
Times, 25 Nov. 1914, p. 3; ‘Germans Bested’, Daily Mail, 25 Nov. 1914, p. 6; ‘Loyal India: Baffled 
German Intrigues’, The Times, 22 May 1915, p. 18 
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soldiers in the Indian army.
57
 News coverage of the Indian forces on the Western 
Front and of India’s war effort therefore sought to emphasize that Indian Muslims had 
remained loyal to the British empire.
58
 The British press made much of the claims that 
some Indians perceived the war as a holy war in which the British Empire and its 
Allies were on the just side.
59
 Indeed, evidence of dissatisfaction with colonial rule 
was discounted in the British press as no more than ‘mischievous rumours’. News of 
the desertion of Indian soldiers to the German side was represented in terms calculated 
to minimize its effect on the morale of Indian soldiers on the Western Front and on the 
British population,
60
 even as events such as the mutiny in Singapore and the foiled 
Ghadar movement in India gave the lie to an imperial propaganda that focused on 
celebrating the loyalty of the colonies.
61
 Since the colonies’ contribution to the war 
effort and the affirmation of the British cause as a just cause significantly enhanced 
morale, it was necessary that any evidence of colonial resistance should be accounted 
for to the British.
62
 British press propaganda thus emphasized the harmonious working 
together of sepoys and British soldiers at the front,
63
 the welcome accorded to Indian 
 
57 Heike Liebau, ‘The German Foreign Office, Indian Emigrants and Propaganda Efforts Among the 
“Sepoys”’, in Roy et al., When the War Began, pp. 96-128. Imperial anxieties regarding security due to 
the use of Indian soldiers in the war have been discussed at length in David Omissi, Sepoys and the Raj: 
The Indian Army, 1860-1940, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1994, pp. 113-47. 
58 ‘Letters from the Front: German Overtures to the Indian Troops’, The Times, 11 Dec. 1914, p. 6; 
‘Loyal India’, The Times, 14 Jan. 1915, p. 7. 
59
 Thus, the Nizam of Hyderabad was quoted as exhorting his coreligionists to loyally serve the British 
whose cause was described as ‘just and right’, ‘Indian Moslem Loyalty: The Action of Turkey 
Denounced’, The Times, 4 Nov. 1914, p. 7. For references to the British cause being just and holy, see 
Haste, Keep the Home Fires, p. 107; Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda, pp. 95-7, 160, 176-7, 198. 
Also see Gregory’s revisionist interpretation of British war propaganda, which argues that Christian 
values of sacrifice were pervasive during the First World War. Adrian Gregory, The Last Great War: 
British Society and the First World War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 152-86. 
60
 ‘German Dismay at Indian Fighting Qualities’, Manchester Guardian, 31 Oct. 1914, p. 9. 
61
 ‘Indian Riot at Singapore’, Manchester Guardian, 24 Feb. 1915, p. 7.  
62
 ‘German Lies About India, Editorial’, The Times, 20 Nov. 1915, p. 9. 
63 ‘To Relief of Gen. Townshend: Indians from Flanders to the Tigris’, Daily Mail, 29 Jan. 1915, p. 6; 
‘The Calm Spirit of India’, The Times, 19 Mar. 1915, p. 7; ‘Australians and Indians: Friendship at the 
Dardanelles’, The Times, 9 Aug. 1915, p. 7  
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soldiers by the French population and the cordial relations of Indian troops with the 
French civilian population.
64
  
The haste in deploying sepoys to a European theatre had overturned a pre-war 
decision to reserve Indian troops for frontier campaigns and not having them fight a 
European enemy. Given that Indian soldiers were outfitted for frontier warfare, their 
clothing and equipment were particularly ill-suited to the much colder climate and 
conditions of service on the Western front. The inability to evacuate sick and wounded 
Indian soldiers to India or Egypt meant that hospitals had to be hastily improvised for 
Indian soldiers in Britain and this early disarray led to criticism of poor medical 
arrangements for loyal colonial soldiers.
65
 Hospitals opened in Brighton and southern 
England were placed by Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, under the 
charge of Sir Walter Lawrence, who was designated the Commissioner for the Indian 
Sick and Wounded. Lawrence’s arrangements were advertised as tangible 
demonstrations of British paternalism and benevolence towards their Indian subjects 
and stressed imperial partnership in the war.
66
 India Office and officials charged with 
administering these hospitals were keenly aware of the possibilities and dangers 
presented by them for wartime propaganda and widely distributed accounts and 
images of the excellent hospital arrangements made for Indian troops in Britain.
67
 
Lawrence followed a deliberate policy of using Indian military hospitals on the 
Western front as centre-pieces of imperial war propaganda, arguing that ‘Indians who 
 
64
 The following are representative: ‘The Indian Troops at Marseilles’, The Times, 2 Oct. 1914, p. 9.; ‘A 
Day At – Where Our Indian Troops Wait’, The Times, 25 Oct. 1914, p. 3; ‘Our Indian Comrades’, 
Manchester Guardian, 3 Dec. 1914, p. 9; ‘East and West Join Hands in France’, The War Illustrated 
Album deluxe: The Story of the Great European War told by Camera, Pen and Pencil, Amalgamated 
Press, London, 1915, vol. 3, p. 801; ‘Brothers in Arms from East and West in Bagdad’, Hammerton 
(ed.), War Illustrated Album deluxe, 1919, vol. 10, p. 3398. 
65
 Harrison, Medical War, pp. 52-4. 
66 ‘“Hail to the King-Emperor!”: Royal Visit to Indian Wounded’, Daily Mail, 18 Nov. 1914, p. 3. 
67
 ‘Wounded Indians’, The Times, 2 Jan. 1915, p. 11; ‘Wounded Indians at Brighton’, The Times, 28 
May 1915, p. 11. 
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have been tended in hospital in England will take back to India tidings of goodwill and 
kindliness, and feelings of gratitude and respect’.68 He emphasized that the good 
treatment of Indian troops in hospitals on the Western front and in England would 
translate into political gains in India: ‘I never lose an opportunity of impressing on all 
who are working in these Hospitals that great political issues are involved in making 
the stay of the Indians in England as agreeable as possible.’69 Hardinge was also 
convinced of the ‘excellent political results in India’ of news of the hospital 
arrangements in Britain.
70
 Lawrence advocated publicity of these hospitals since they 
reflected well on both the War Office and the Indian Medical Service.
71
 Public 
opinion in India was also the considered target of those associated with hospital 
arrangements on the Western front: ‘everything should be done to encourage 
responsible people, who understand India and carry any weight in that country, to visit 
the Hospitals [in England].’
72
 The lavish setting of the Brighton Royal Pavilion, which 
was converted to a hospital, was meant to evoke ‘Eastern’ splendour and was widely 
used in propaganda.
73
 The British press played an important role in transforming 
medical arrangements for Indian soldiers in Britain into centrepieces of propaganda in 
Britain and across South Asia.
74
 The British press’s predilection for news stories about 
Indian soldiers and their ‘exotic’ ethnic practices was in line with this portrayal of 
Indian war hospitals in south England. It portrayed the tolerance of colonial subjects’ 
 
68
 ‘Arrangements Made for Indian Sick and Wounded in England and France: Report by Col Sir Walter 
Lawrence to the SoS for War’, Walter Lawrence Papers, India Office Records and Private Papers 
(IORPP), British Library (BL), Mss Eur/F143/65, [hereafter, Lawrence Papers], p. 4. 
69
 Lawrence to Kitchener, 15 Feb 1915, Lawrence Papers, Mss Eur/F143/65, p. 27. 
70
 Hardinge’s letter cited by Lawrence in his letter to Kitchener, 27 May 1915, Lawrence Papers, Mss 
Eur/F143/65, p. 67. 
71 Lawrence to Kitchener, 21 Jul 1915, Lawrence Papers, Mss Eur/F143/65, p. 92. 
72
 Ibid., p. 92. 
73
 ‘Song of the Sikhs: Lord Crewe’s Visit to Indian Wounded’, The Times, 30 Mar. 1915, p. 7.  
74
 See, for instance: ‘Indian Heroes: Modest Story of the Great Charge’, Daily Mail, 9 Nov. 1914, p. 3; 
‘What the Indian Soldiers Think’, Daily Mail, 9 Dec. 1914, p. 6 ; ‘Royal Visit to Brighton’, The Times, 
11 Jan. 1915, p. 4; ‘“In the King’s Palace”: Indians’ Appreciation of the Brighton Hospital’, The Times, 
18 Feb. 1916, p. 3. 
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ethnic and religious diversity as an imperial generosity, which was believed to have 
created a feeling of deep loyalty towards the empire.
75
 The portrayal of the eating 
practices of Indian soldiers was especially popular in the press, and was meant to 
foreground British tolerance of different cultural mores.
76
 However, some of this 
attention was also aimed at reassuring Indians that sepoys’ ethnic practices were being 
scrupulously respected, in order to ensure continuing recruitment from the Indian 
‘martial races’.
77
  
However, the presence of Indian soldiers and the celebration of their martial 
prowess also created unique challenges to the imperial gender order when liaisons 
began to develop between Indian sepoys and local British women with attendant 
anxieties about miscegenation and the blurring of racial boundaries.
78
 This led to the 
introduction of strict discipline in Indian war hospitals in Brighton, which required 
Indian soldiers to be practically imprisoned within the hospitals to prevent contact 
with British women.
79
 To compensate for the considerable dissatisfaction that this 
created among Indian soldiers, special ‘amusements’ were organized.
80
 The cinema 
theatres of Brighton ran special shows for the Indian troops and drives were arranged 
 
75
 ‘India’s Highlanders: Gallant Gurkhas Who Will Never be Beaten’, Star, 10 Oct. 1914, p. 3; ‘Indians 
in Camp: Picturesque Scenes in the New Forest’, The Times, 28 Oct. 1914, p. 5. Sehrawat has argued 
that the ethnicity of sepoys was important for imperial military officers reliant on mercenaries from a 
colonized population and anxious about the loyalty of such troops. This anxiety was especially 
pronounced during the early phases of the First World War when Indian soldiers were deployed on the 
Western Front and was especially evident in the care regarding their ethnic practices in war hospitals in 
southern England during 1914-16. See Sehrawat, Colonial Medical Care, especially 202-19. 
76
 ‘Care for Caste at Indian hospitals: Mr Chamberlain and the V.C. Manchester Guardian, 14 Jul. 
1915, p. 8; ‘The King’s Message to the Indian Army Corps’, Manchester Guardian, 29 Dec. 1915, p. 4. 
77
 ‘The Indian Troops’, Letter to the Editor by Gen. O’M. Creagh (retired Commander-in-Chief of the 
Indian Army), 5 Dec. 1914, p. 9; ‘Indian Soldiers’ Mistreatment: Mischievous Rumours’, Manchester 
Guardian, 15 Apr. 1915, p. 12; ‘Wounded Indians in the New Forest’, The Times, 1 Mar. 1915, p. 5; 
‘Indians in Brighton Hospital: Care for Caste Prejudices’, The Times, 4 Sep. 1915, p. 3. 
78
 This was especially strict at the Kitchener Indian Hospital, ‘A Report on the Kitchener Indian 
Hospital Brighton’, c.1916, India Office Record (IOR), British Library (BL), L/MIL/17/5/2016, 
[henceforth, ‘KIH Report’]. See J. Greenhut, ‘Race, sex and war: the impact of race and sex on morale 
and health services for the Indian Corps on the Western Front, 1914’, Military Affairs, vol. 45 (1981), 
71-4; Philippa Levine, ‘Battle Colors: Race, Sex, and Colonial Soldiery in World War I’, Journal of 
Women’s History, Volume 9, Number 4,1998, pp. 104–130.  
79
 ‘KIH Report’, Harrison, ‘Disease, Discipline and Dissent’. 
80
 ‘KIH Report’. 
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for them in motor ambulances. Indian officers went on weekly conducted tours of 
London,
81
 which focused on royal figures and the grandeur of Britain – all meant to 
inspire awe and reverence for the empire.
82
 This positive propaganda was meant to 
maintain recruitment in regions such as the Punjab, from which a substantial 
proportion of the British Indian army was recruited, and to sustain commitment of 
material and financial resources from the rest of the Indian civilian population.
83
  
The severe medical breakdown in the Mesopotamian campaign from October 1915 
brought propaganda by the Indian government under considerable strain despite the 
existence of a particularly rigorous local censorship regime. Censorship in 
Mesopotamia was severe, even greater than in the Dardanelles campaign. As Arnold 
Wilson (then deputy political officer in Mesopotamia) pointed out, military 
censorship, which applied both to the letters from the front and of the official press 
correspondent, was meant ‘less to prevent information reaching the enemy than to 
prevent the public in India and at home becoming aware of the appalling sufferings 
that were being endured by our troops’.
84
 Thus, even Edmund Candler, a journalist 
appointed the ‘Official Eye Witness’ for the campaign by the British government, was 
subjected to close censorship soon after his arrival in December 1915. His dispatches 
were censored thrice: in the field, in Basra and in India before they reached London, 
 
81
 Section on ‘Amusements’, ibid., p. 14; ‘Sikh Sightseers’, The Times, 9 Apr. 1915, p. 10; ‘Indian 
Officers in London’, The Times, 29 Sep. 1915, p. 5. 
82
 Section on ‘Amusements’, ‘KIH Report’, p. 14; ‘Indian Army Devotion: Relentless Swords Against 
the Foe in France’, Daily Mail, 11 Dec. 1914, p. 3; ‘Wounded Indians to See London’, The Times, 24 
Dec. 1914, p. 5; ‘Wounded Indians in London: At Lord Roberts’s Grave’, The Times, 6 Jan. 1915, p. 4; 
‘Indian Wounded at Brighton’, The Times, 26 Jul. 1915, p. 5. 
83
 Yong, The Garrison State, pp. 105-8 and Mazumder, Army and the making of Punjab. ‘Treatment of 
Indian Troops: Spread of Baseless Rumors’, The Times, 15 Apr. 1915, p. 9. 
84
 Arnold Wilson, Loyalties Mesopotamia, 1914-1917: A Personal and Historical Record (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1969, 1st edn 1930), p. 164. For a recent effort at problematizing the significance of 
propaganda and censorship on the British home front, see discussion of military censorship in Helen 
McCartney, Citizen Soldiers: The Liverpool Territorials in the First World War, Cambridge, 
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efforts to censor communication between soldiers of a Territorial regiment and the civilian population, 
military censorship for Indian soldiers had a second layer of censorship deployed by the India Office in 
addition to regimental censorship, Omissi, Indian Voices, pp. 4-9.  
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where they were censored again.
85
 Even generals’ letters sent from the Mesopotamian 
campaign were censored.
86
 Despite such elaborate arrangements, the scandalous 
breakdown in Mesopotamia became a major topic of debate in the British press. The 
next section takes a closer look at the much more negative coverage of the severe 
shortages occurring in the Mesopotamia campaign from early 1916, which presented 
the Northcliffe press as exposing government incompetence during the war and 
employing the trope of the ‘Mesopotamia muddle’. It shows that the Northcliffe press 
was undeniably influential in demanding a commission to investigate the humiliating 
military reversals in Mesopotamia and determining its scope of enquiry. The ire of the 
conservative press, which included vitriolic attacks from the Morning Post, came to 
focus on the figure of the finance member of the colonial Indian government, William 
Meyer, who was singled out for blame for the failure to provide essential supplies and 
medical aid to soldiers in Mesopotamia. Meyer was seen as the personification of a 
rigid bureaucracy – styled ‘hill-top’ government – which failed to adequately mobilize 
India’s economic resources for the imperial war effort.  
 
Politics of Scandal: the ‘Mesopotamia Muddle’ in the Northcliffe Press 
The Northcliffe press broke news of the medical breakdown in the Mesopotamian 
theatre. Early reports published in The Times from March 1916 were based on letters 
sent by soldiers privately from the front, and confirmed by its Bombay 
correspondents, about severe shortages in medical supplies and in essential personnel 
such as nurses and doctors.
87
 Correspondence to newspapers from relatives of soldiers 
 
85
 Edmund Candler, The Long Road to Baghdad (London: Cassell & Company, 1919), p. 65-72. 
86 ‘Extracts from a letter from an officer in Mesopotamia, 5 Feb. 1916’, Lawrence Papers, Mss 
Eur/F143/101, p. 11. 
87
 The first report was made in ‘Mismanagement in Mesopotamia’, The Times, 14 Mar. 1916, p. 7. 
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quoting private letters from the Mesopotamian front painted a picture of suffering 
soldiers and aroused public outrage:  
We were very short of rations in the last fight and were nearly reduced to a 
state of starvation; war out here is no joke. We had very hard fighting and 
marching, and no rest; comforts, absolutely nil. We consider ourselves lucky if 
we get our daily bread…. [W]e can’t fight on an empty stomach; the med have 
done very well and keep wonderfully cheerful under depressing 
circumstances.
88
  
Correspondence from the public commending The Times for breaking news of the 
long-standing breakdown confirmed the image of the Northcliffe press as the 
champion of the soldier.
89
 Northcliffe, the proprietor of both The Times and the Daily 
Mail had fashioned himself as a watchdog representing public interest by using his 
papers to advocate an efficient prosecution of the war, especially by bringing 
government errors to the attention of readers.
90
 In this, the Northcliffe press was 
following an established genre of news reporting which had developed over the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century – uncovering defects in British defence policy 
in the face of official inaction.
91
 The breakdown thus became one in a series of 
military disasters reported by the Northcliffe press in late 1915 and 1916, as it 
mounted criticism of government handling of the war and the endemic indecisiveness 
 
88 ‘Mesopotamian Needs’, Letter from John Byrne, The Times, 17 Mar. 1916, p. 9. The letter from 
Byrne’s son, which was quoted was especially harrowing as it was written just days before his death. 
89
 For instance, ‘Fortiter’ claimed shortages had existed right from the beginning of the campaign, as 
early as December 1914. The Northcliffe press had earlier begun campaigns that were meant to uncover 
official shortcomings that had, it was claimed, placed soldiers’ lives in danger. Thompson, ‘Rise and 
Fall’. See also McEwen’s account of Northcliffe’s criticism of Kitchener early in the war, even at the 
expense of a fall in the circulation of his papers, J.M. McEwen, ‘“Brass-Hats” and the British Press 
During the First World War’, Canadian Journal of History, vol. 18, no. 1, 1983. 
90 Thompson, ‘Fleet Street’, pp. 122-3. 
91
 Haste, Keep the Home Fires, p. 7 and J. Lee Thompson, Politicians, the Press and Propaganda: Lord 
Northcliffe and the Great War, 1914-19, Kent, Kent State University Press, 1999, pp. 12-14. 
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that had marred the Asquith coalition.
92
 Yet such was the enormity of the 
Mesopotamia scandal that Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of The Times, insisted that it 
made ‘Crimea seem [like a] trivial joke’.
93
 
The neglect of the wounded – who were crowded on unsuitable river transport and 
left unattended for days – evinced intensely angry reactions since medical services 
during war had become essential to morale.
94
 Liberal newspapers such as the 
Manchester Guardian, Daily News, Daily Chronicle and the radical Star, also shared 
the public indignation at disclosures of the horrors wounded soldiers had endured on 
the Mesopotamian front and criticized the Indian government for failing to make 
adequate medical arrangements.
95
 Such cross-party indignation reflected a wider shift 
in attitudes towards medical care for soldiers during the First World War to keep up 
 
92
 Haste, Keep the Home Fires, p. 75-6. For details of the role of the press in engineering Asquith’s 
downfall, see McEwen, ‘Fall of Asquith’. For an analysis of the criticism of the Asquith coalition and 
the rising support for Lloyd George as a decisive war leader during this period of intense press 
criticism, see John Grigg, Lloyd George: From peace to ar, 1912-1916, Methuen, London, 1985; 
George Cassar, Asquith as War Leader, Hambledon, London, 1994; Thompson, Politicians, Press, 
Propaganda, pp. 103-22. Anger towards the Mesopotamian breakdown was also fuelled by growing 
war-weariness in 1917. Haste, Keep the Home Fires, pp. 74-6; Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda, p. 
26. 
93
 G. Dawson to Northcliffe, 14 Jul. 1916, Northcliffe Papers, Add MS 62251, p. 142. Harrison argues 
that there was a lag in adopting elements of this medical machine developed on the Western Front on 
fronts farther away from metropolitan scrutiny, such as those in Mesopotamia and Gallipoli. Harrison, 
Medical War, pp. 297-9. 
94
 Harrison, Medical War, pp. 11-13, 301-2. See also T. J. Mitchell and G. M. Smith, History of the 
Great War based on Official Documents, Medical Services: Casualties and Medical Statistics of the 
Great War (London: HMSO, 1931), [henceforth British Official History: Medical Statistics], pp. 5-6. 
95
 See, for instance, ‘Our Mesopotamian Troops: An “Inexcusable” Medical Breakdown’, Manchester 
Guardian, 23 Mar. 1916, p. 5; ‘Editorial: Who is Responsible?’, Star, 23 Mar. 1916, p. 2; ‘Supplies for 
Mesopotamia: Mr Chamberlain says Many Offers were Accepted’, Star, 24 Mar. 1916, ‘Mesopotamia: 
More Questions about Hospital Arrangements’, Star, 28 Mar. 1916, p. 1; ‘House of Lords: The 
Mesopotamia “Breakdown”’ Manchester Guardian, 19 Jul. 1916, p. 6. In contrast to the conservative 
press, the liberal press gave much less space to coverage of reports of the medical breakdown through 
1916 and the first half of 1917, though parliamentary discussions about it were regularly reported. ‘The 
Mesopotamia Black Book: Nobody Has Yet Been Punished’, Star, 27 Jun. 1917, p. 1; ‘Pukka’, ibid., p. 
2; ‘Public Anger Over Mesopotamia: “No Whitewashing”’, Star, 28 Jun. 1917, p. 1; ‘Mesopotamia 
Scandal’, Ibid., p. 1; ‘Mesopotamia Report: Expedition Badly Organised and Ill-Equipped, Indian 
Government’s Responsibility’, Manchester Guardian, 27 Jun. 1917, p. 5; ‘Mesopotamia Scandal: 
Sufferings of the Wounded’, Manchester Guardian, 28 Jun. 1917, p. 8; ‘Mesopotamia: Questions in the 
House’, Manchester Guardian, 5 Jul. 1917, p. 6; Manchester Guardian, ‘The Blunder of Bagdad and its 
Tragic Sequel: Mesopotamia Muddling’, Daily Chronicle, 27 Jun. 1917, p. 1; ‘Mesopotamia: 
Sensational Disclosures’, Daily News & Leader [henceforth, Daily News], 27 Jun. 1917, p. 1; ‘Medical 
Breakdown: Painful Revelations of the Sufferings of the Troops’, Ibid., p. 3; ‘Editorial: Crime & 
Punishment’, Daily News, 28 Jun. 1917, p. 2. 
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the morale of both fighting men and of their families on the home front.
96
 This also 
went against new military practices wherein medical and sanitary arrangements on the 
front were expected to be efficient and work as part of a war machine, with emphasis 
on conserving both manpower and resources by treating wounded or ill soldiers and 
returning them to the fighting line.
97
  
The reporting on the scandal in the Northcliffe press initiated parliamentary 
discussions and significantly shaped the questions that were raised.
98
 Accusing the 
government of excessive secrecy and concealing evidence of incompetence to retain 
power, the Northcliffe press vociferously demanded that parliament discuss the 
scandal.
99
 Correspondents to The Times were suspicious of ‘the question being 
shelved by the authorities’.
100
 Politicians, including Lord Midleton (secretary of state 
for India, 1903-05) and Lord Sydenham, as well as important officials such as 
Chamberlain and Lawrence had been receiving private reports of the breakdown since 
early 1916.
101
 Politicians alarmed by reports of the breakdown felt able to publicly 
raise questions in Parliament once it had been reported in the press.
102
 Continuing 
 
96 Harrison, Medical War, pp. 300-2. 
97
 Ibid., pp. 295-6. 
98
 Members of Parliament, such as Ian Malcolm, also wrote to the Times in support of its exposé of the 
scandalous medical breakdown. Malcolm was a Tory politician who had not only travelled to India but 
was associated with Red Cross work in Mesopotamia.  
99
 Lovat Fraser, ‘Who is Responsible? Townshend’s Besieged Little Army in Kut’ Daily Mail, 27 Mar. 
1916, p. 4; Lovat Fraser, ‘The Mystery: Who sent Townshend to Baghdad?’ Daily Mail, 24 Jul. 1916, 
p. 4. Press censorship was often used for political ends during the war. Censorship helped manage fall 
of civilian morale due to defeats but also to prevent criticism of the government’s management of the 
war. 
100
 Letter from James Rolt, The Times, 17 Mar. 1916, p. 9. 
101
 Private letters intimating medical shortages were sent to Chamberlain from February 1916. For 
summaries of such private letters, see ‘Medical Arrangements, Mesopotamia (enclosed with letter from 
Chamberlain to Hardinge, 11 February 1916)’, AC46/2/57; ‘Copy of Letter dated 16 January 1916, 
from an Officer Serving in Mesopotamia’, AC46/2/58; ‘Extracts from Private Letters from 
Mesopotamia (enclosed with letter from Chamberlain to Hardinge, 24 January 1916)’, AC46/2/60; 
‘Extract from letter from Bombay’, 28 Jan. 1916; AC46/2/61; letter from Chamberlain to [Hardinge?], 
22 Feb. 1916, AC46/2/2, all in the Austen Chamberlain Collection. Lawrence received letters from 
October 1915, some of which were sent by messenger by highly placed officers to escape the censor. 
‘Extracts from letters from Indian Medical Service officers describing their experiences in 
Mesopotamia’, Lawrence Private Papers, Mss Eur/F143/101, pp. 1-11. 
102
 See, for instance, private letters and reports forwarded by Lord Midleton (the Unionist and 
Conservative MP and the former Governor of Bombay), Lord Selborne (the Liberal Unionist) and the 
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shortages of food and medical supplies months after news of the scandal broke in 
Britain strengthened calls in Parliament for an official enquiry into the 
mismanagement of the campaign.
103
 In the face of mounting evidence being revealed 
to the public, Chamberlain was forced to admit that a ‘lamentable medical 
breakdown’
104
 had taken place in the Mesopotamian campaign despite earlier attempts 
to inquire into the breakdown confidentially through the Vincent-Bingley 
Commission.
105
  
The emotive language of exposé and reform used by the Northcliffe press was 
particularly effective in bringing down public opprobrium on the Indian government 
given the increased political influence of the press during the war. This distrust of the 
Indian government’s statements on the breakdown was also evident in Parliament.
106
 
Even despite such criticism, the Northcliffe press, with its long-standing tradition of 
being sympathetic to imperial interests and paying greater attention to Indian news, 
took a less harsh view of the culpability of the Indian government for the scandal than 
did the arch-conservative Morning Post.
107
 The latter’s news reports condemned the 
                                                                                                                                       
King to Chamberlain. Selborne to Chamberlain, 23 Jun. 1916, AC46/2/46; Curzon to Chamberlain, 2 
Apr. 1916, AC46/2/29; Midleton to Chamberlain, 1 Apr. 1916, AC46/2/28; Stamfordham to 
Chamberlain, 28 Feb. 1916, AC46/2/65; all in the Austen Chamberlain Collection, Cadbury Research 
Library, Birmingham [henceforth, Austen Chamberlain Collection]. For Midleton’s persistent demands 
for greater information regarding the campaign, see ‘Campaign in Mesopotamia’, HL Deb 30 Mar. 
1916 vol. 21 cc587-93, ‘Operations in Mesopotamia’, HL Deb 22 May 1916 vol. 22 cc2-3, ‘Rations of 
the Troops in Mesopotamia’, HL Deb 25 Jul. 1916 vol. 22 cc905-7.  
103
 Ibid. 
104
 ‘Mesopotamia Hospitals’, Daily Mail, 24 Mar. 1916, p. 6. 
105
 Mark Harrison shows that as the war office took over the command of the campaign in August 1916, 
the ‘medical machine’ developed on the Western front to evacuate casualties and improve the health of 
soldiers, was finally deployed on the Mesopotamian front. Harrison, Medical War, pp. 274-84. 
106
 ‘Rations of the Troops in Mesopotamia’. 25 Jul. 1916, HL Deb 25 Jul. 1916 vol 22 cc905-7905. 
107
 Chandrika Kaul has outlined the imperial sympathies of Northcliffe and their role in the greater 
attention given to covering Indian news by the Times and the Daily Mail in her ‘Popular Press and 
Empire’, pp. 45-69. McEwen points out that the views of the editor of the Morning Post, H.A. Gwynne, 
closely reflected those of Sir Edward Carson, leader of the Irish Unionist party. Carson had resigned 
from the Asquith coalition in October 1915 and since been an active critic of the Asquith government. 
McEwen, ‘Fall of Asquith’, Thompson, ‘Fleet Street Colossus’. He led the unionist war committee, 
formed in January 1916 for the more vigorous prosecution of the war, which was especially active in 
condemning the Mesopotamia scandal.  McEwen, ‘Fall of Asquith’, Thompson, ‘Fleet Street Colossus’. 
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Indian government of being an ‘absolootely nootral [sic]’ country as it ‘[did] not want 
to be bothered about a distant and disagreeable conflict’.  
Criticism of the Indian government aimed at discovering further lapses was strong 
in both the Parliament and British press as 1916 drew to a close.
108
 The Mesopotamia 
breakdown, which was characterized variously as the ‘Mesopotamia muddle’, 
‘Mesopotamia scandal’, and the ‘terrible story of Mesopotamia’ created a trope for 
criticizing the colonial state which was widely used in the British and Indian press. 
Private reports of mismanagement by the Indian government leading to poor 
arrangements affecting soldiers, and the disclosure thereof in sensationalized news 
became a pattern which was repeatedly utilised in criticizing the colonial regime. This 
was especially evident during the Karachi Troop Train disaster in July 1916,
109
 which 
was widely covered in the press with questioning in Parliament.
110
 The death of 
soldiers in a hospital ship due to adverse weather conditions also drew a prompt 
response both from the India Office and newspapers.
111
 The Morning Post reported 
instances of poor medical arrangements and overcrowding of Indian hospitals,
112
 
 
108 See repeated questioning in Parliament regarding military medical equipment, military hospitals in 
India and suggestions for their reform. ‘Army Medical Equipment (India)’, Hansard, Commons 
Debates, 5th ser., lxxxv, col. 650: 7 Aug. 1916; ‘Military Hospitals (India)’, Hansard, Commons 
Debates, 5th ser., lxxxvi, col. 978W: 24 Oct. 1916; ‘Barrackpore Hospital and Barracks’, ibid., col. 
1117: 25 Oct. 1916; specifically about Indian military hospitals: ‘Military Hospitals’, Hansard, 
Commons Debates, 5th ser., xcv, col. 1942-3W: 11 Jul. 1917. 
109
 The deaths of British soldiers from heat stroke in a train transporting soldiers from Karachi to 
Peshawar caused considerable stir as it came at a time when the government was asserting that earlier 
lapses in organization had been remedied. The news of the tragedy was broken by the Truth, a weekly 
journal, which had a reputation for investigative journalism exposing frauds. Truth, Aug. 1916. ‘Indian 
Troop Train Tragedy: Many Deaths from Heatstroke’, Manchester Guardian, 22 Jul. 1916, p. 6; 
‘Editorial: The New Black Hole Tragedy’, Morning Post, 22 Jul. 1916, p. 6; ‘Imperial Parliament: 
Karachi Train Blunder’, Morning Post, 2 Aug. 1916, p. 4; ‘Territorial Death Train’, Daily Express, 22 
Jul. 1916, p. 5. 
110
 The news of the tragedy was reported widely in the empire as well as in the US and proved very 
embarrassing to the Indian government. See, for instance, New York Sun, 6 Aug. 1916, vol. 83, p. 39. 
‘Deaths from Heat Stroke’, HC Deb 20 Jul. 1916 vol. 84 cc1226-7W; ‘Death of Territorials in India’, 
HL Deb 01 Aug. 1916 vol. 22 cc1037-42; ‘Death of Territorials in India’, HL Deb 25 Jul. 1916 vol. 22 
cc911-6. 
111
 Many Deaths on Hospital Ship: Terrible Effects of Heat’, Manchester Guardian, 8 Aug 1916, p. 5. 
Viceroy of India, ‘Hospital Ship Heat Strokes’, Daily Mail, 8 Aug. 1916, p. 5.  
112
 ‘Indian Hospital Scandals: Lamentable Deficiencies’, Morning Post, 13 Oct. 1916, p. 4; ‘Questions 
in Parliament’, Morning Post, 21 Oct. 1916, p. 5. 
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while the Daily Mail ran several reports on the poor quality glasses supplied by the 
Indian government.
113
 So effective did the trope of the ‘Mesopotamia muddle’ become 
that even Indian newspapers used it to criticize the Indian government for the 
breakdown of medical arrangements in the Afghan campaign in 1919.
114
 
The role of the conservative British press in instigating the Commission and in 
shaping its enquiry and report has not been sufficiently acknowledged.
115
 The 
Northcliffe press vociferously demanded an investigation of the mismanagement of 
the campaign – sustaining public attention on the campaign. Two of the claims 
repeatedly made by the Northcliffe press were instrumental in initiating the enquiry 
and in setting the terms of the investigation. The Northcliffe press claimed that the 
decision to advance to Baghdad was an opportunistic decision made by the 
government to seek a victory in Mesopotamia in order to detract attention from the 
failures in the Dardanelles.
116
 The second claim repeated in the Northcliffe press 
which determined the shape of the Commission’s enquiry was the demand that 
responsibility be fixed for the Mesopotamian disaster with consequences for 
politicians and senior officials. Questions asked in Parliament clearly echoed the 
Northcliffe press’s criticism.
117
 As demands for parliamentary scrutiny of the 
 
113
 ‘Green Glasses’, Daily Mail, 4 Sep. 1916, p. 3; ‘Green Glasses’, Daily Mail, 5 Sep. 1916, p. 3; 
‘Soldiers’ Green Goggles’, Daily Mail, 6 Sep. 1916, p. 3; George Spiller, ‘Bad Green Glasses’, Daily 
Mail, 9 Sep. 1916, p. 3. 
114 See news reports in Justice (Madras), 11 Aug. 1919, Supplement to Punjab Press Abstract, vol. 32, 
no. 35, p. 85, the Hindu (Madras), 20 Aug. 1919, ibid., p. 94. 
115
 For a discussion of the report see Davis, Ends and Means. Harrison, Medical War, pp. 204-27, 262-
90, covers the medical aspects of the breakdown. Sehrawat, Colonial Medical Care, pp. 241-8 
examines the impact of the culture of economy within the government on military and civilian medical 
care. We do not argue that the judgements of the commission were influenced by the conservative press 
in Britain but rather that the latter influenced the lines of enquiry pursued by the commission. 
116
 The government had clearly been influenced by a desire for victory to boost public morale after the 
stalemate on the western Front and the debacle in the Dardanelles. However, David French argues 
convincingly that the decision to focus on the mid-East was meant to strengthen the British position in 
Asia and protect British imperial interests. French, ‘Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut’. 
117
 See repeated demands in Parliament to ask the government to release papers related to the 
Mesopotamian campaign, ‘Mesopotamia Papers’, HL Deb 21 Jun. 1916 vol. 22 cc336-8, ‘Mesopotamia 
Papers’, HL Deb 06 Jul. 1916 vol. 22 cc601-2, ‘Mesopotamia Papers’, HL Deb 11 Jul. 1916 vol. 22 
cc606-8; ‘Mesopotamia papers’, HL Deb 13 Jul. 1916 vol. 22 cc724-8.  
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Mesopotamia campaign mounted, Asquith’s government was forced to accede to the 
setting up of the two commissions to enquire into the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia 
campaigns.
118
  
In news coverage of the enquiry into the breakdown, the Northcliffe press again 
provided the lead with a persistence in reporting embarrassing incidents, which 
prompted questioning in Parliament. By repeatedly suggesting that the Commission 
was an exercise in whitewashing the breakdown which would fail to assign 
responsibility, the Northcliffe Press ensured that its preoccupations influenced the line 
of official enquiry into the campaign. The persistent insinuations by the conservative 
press, especially by the Morning Post, that the Commission might cover-up evidence 
of the government’s culpability seems to have influenced its report, which specifically 
addressed those aspects of the expedition which had been stressed in the press 
campaign.
119
 Asquith was to single out the Daily Mail for its spiteful coverage raising 
a clamour for punishment of highly placed politicians and officers,
120
 even as vicious 
attacks on Hardinge and other officials were made in the radical sections of the 
conservative press.
121
  
The Commission’s Report, made public on 27 June 1917, clearly blamed the Indian 
government’s finance of the campaign,
122
 and caused a veritable storm in news 
coverage, with newspapers both in Britain and India criticizing the colonial 
 
118
 ‘Still wobbling: Mr. Asquith Postpones once more’, Daily Mail, 19 Apr. 1916, p. 4; ‘Still Hushing-
Up’, Daily Mail, 11 May 1916, p. 5; ‘Mr Asquith: “Please Trust us”’, Daily Mail, 3 May 1916, p. 6; 
‘Carson: Plain Speaking’, Daily Mail, 5 May 1916, p. 6. McEwen has argued that Carson used his 
connections with newspaper editors to engineer the failure of a compromise between Asquith and Lloyd 
George leading to the fall of the coalition in December 1916. McEwen, ‘Fall of Asquith’, Thompson, 
‘Fleet Street Colossus’. 
119
 ‘Mesopotamia Hush-Up’, Daily Mail, 23 Oct. 1916, p. 5.  
120 ‘Mesopotamia: Mr Asquith Blames the Newspapers’, Daily Mail, 14 Jul. 1917, p. 3. 
121
  ‘Shamefully Misplaced’, Morning Post, 11 Jul. 1917, p. 6; ‘Mesopotamia and after’, Lord 
Portsmouth, correspondence to the Morning Post, 12 Jul. 1917, p. 6; ‘Mesopotamia in Chancery’, 
Morning Post, 13 Jul. 1917, p. 6. 
122 Revisiting the medical breakdown, Harrison argues that the logistical difficulties did contribute to 
the breakdown but systemic neglect of medical arrangements by military authorities and the absence of 
British public scrutiny exacerbated it. Harrison, Medical War, pp. 288-90. 
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government. So closely had the Northcliffe press followed the enquiry that Dawson 
crowed to Northcliffe after the release of the report that the Times had had a 
‘considerable score over it…. [W]e had managed to get the whole pith of the Report 
extracted for us in advance and had time to discuss it at leisure. No other paper even 
attempted to do it justice.’
123
 The quality liberal newspapers were more restrained in 
their reporting of the shocking revelations made by the Commission than the popular 
evening daily, Star. The latter, like the conservative press, was emphatic in its 
condemnation of the politicians responsible for the medical breakdown, singling out 
prominent conservatives such as Arthur Balfour, Chamberlain and Curzon for 
criticism.
124
 However, unlike the conservative press, liberal newspapers did not 
interpret the Commission’s report as an indictment of the Asquith government.
125
 
Debates about India’s financial contribution to the war had become a popular theme 
in the Northcliffe press. There was broad consensus in the conservative press that the 
cost of the Mesopotamian campaign should be borne not by the British exchequer but 
by the Indian government. Lovat Fraser argued that ‘overburdened England’ should 
not have to pay for the campaign,
126
 which Barnes maintained was being fought to 
‘defend the Indian people from the horrors of a German invasion’.
127
 The Northcliffe 
press was sharply critical of the fact that the Indian government was not paying for the 
cost of the Mesopotamia campaign. Both the Times and the Daily Mail explained to 
their readers that under existing agreements, all overseas expeditions in the service of 
 
123 Dawson to Northcliffe, 28 Jun. 1917, Northcliffe Papers, BL, London [henceforth Northcliffe 
Papers], Add MS 62245, p. 43. 
124
 ‘Pukka’, Star, 27 Jun. 1917, p. 2; ‘Milner, Curzon, Carson’, Star, 17 Jul. 1917, p. 2; ‘Mr Balfour has 
a Bad Press Day’, Star, 13 Jul. 1917, p. 1; ‘Mess upon Mess’, Star, 13 Jul. 1917, p. 3; ‘No 
Responsibility’, Star, 16 Jul. 1917, p. 2; ‘The Byng Boys are Still Here’, Star, 18 Jul. 1917, p. 2. 
125
 ‘Editorial: Fish and Flesh’, Star, 28 Jun. 1917, p. 2; ‘Mr Balfour has a Bad Press Day’, Star, 13 Jul. 
1917, p. 1; ‘Editorial: Mesopotamia - Blames Fair and Unfair’, Daily Chronicle, 28 Jun. 1917, p. 2; 
‘Impeachment and Court martial: Public Anger over Mesopotamia’, Star, 28 Jun. 1917, p. 1. 
126 Fraser, ‘Who is Responsible?’ Lovat Fraser, who wrote leaders for the Daily Mail, had been a 
journalist in India. Kaul, Reporting the Raj, pp. 61-2, 66, 106. 
127
 ‘Mesopotamia’, Letter to the Editor by Barnes, The Times, 31 Mar. 1916, p. 9. 
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imperial defence were to be borne by Britain and not by India even if Indian forces 
were deployed. British newspapers argued that since these campaigns were meant to 
protect British India, the cost ought to be borne by the Indian and not the British 
government.
128
  
The Indian government was portrayed in the conservative press as shirking from 
contributing adequately to the war by failing to increase taxation during what was 
portrayed as a time of prosperity. William Meyer, the finance member of the colonial 
Indian Government (1913-18), came to be seen as the embodiment of a parsimonious 
and rigid Indian administration, characterized as ‘hill-top government’ in the 
conservative British press for its failure to take ‘outside opinion’ into account.
129
 
Meyer was especially blamed for the failure of the colonial state to release adequate 
funds for the campaign and medical care of soldiers. Under a news report titled 
‘William Meyer: The man who grudged the money’, the Daily Mail argued that the 
finance member had continued the pre-war policy of cutting military expenditure even 
during the war.
130
 The Indian government’s severe parsimony towards the British 
army on the Mesopotamian front was contrasted with the budget speech made by 
Meyer in March 1915, in which he had waxed eloquent on the ‘healthy condition’ of 
Indian finances.
131
 The Times acknowledged that reports of this speech were compared 
by suffering soldiers in Mesopotamia with their own lack of necessities, leading to the 
 
128 Fraser, ‘Who is Responsible?’ 
129
 See for instance, Lovat Fraser, ‘Mesopotamia’, Daily Mail, 27 Jun. 1917, p. 2. ‘Defects of the Indian 
System’, The Times, 2 Jul. 1917, p. 9; ‘Hill-Top Government’, Letter to the Editor from ‘K.’, The 
Times, 3 Jul. 1917, p. 9. 
130 ‘Sir William Meyer: the man who Grudged the money’, Daily Mail, 29 Jun. 1917, p. 3. ‘More about 
Mesopotamia’, The Times, 29 Jun. 1917, p. 7. 
131
 ‘Responsibilities in Mesopotamia’, The Times, 14 Jul. 1916, p. 9.  
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widely held conclusion that the Indian government’s economizing had caused the 
breakdown.
132
  
Nor was this view entirely confined to right-wing opinion. The liberal Sir Victor 
Horsley and independent minded conservative MP Aubrey Herbert had both written 
from the front similarly blaming the Indian Finance department for depressing 
expenditure on the army and on medical care.
133
 Lloyd George’s War Memoirs were 
particularly critical of the Indian government’s parsimony, and lack of efficiency and 
organization.
134
 Old India hands such as Hugh S. Barnes (who was not disinterested 
due to his growing interests in middle-eastern oil), argued in a letter to the Times that 
there was no excuse for the Indian government’s parsimony, as ‘[f]inancially… the 
Budget show[ed], the Indian Government has been hardly touched by the war.’
135
  
Correspondents to the Times were even more strident in their criticism of Meyer, 
with former government officials writing to point out instances when the finance 
department had cut expenditure proposed by military and Indian Medical Service 
officers.
136
 Letters to the editor also pointed to the fact that there had been a long 
tradition of reducing military expenditure in India, with Meyer’s predecessor, Guy 
 
132
 It would seem that such a connection had indeed been made. Aubrey Herbert, the Conservative MP, 
at the front asked that a telegram be sent directly to Chamberlain claiming that ‘All realise here that the 
past economy of the Government of India is responsible for our failures…’ Telegram from Viceroy, 17 
May 1916, IOR/L/MIL/7/17935. 
133
  Sir Victory Horsley (1857-1916) was a renowned educator, a Liberal Party candidate and had 
volunteered as a surgeon at the beginning of the war. Horsley’s letter condemning the Indian finance 
department for depressing expenditure on medical aid for soldiers on the Mesopotamian front had been 
sent to the British Medical Journal merely ten days before his death from sun-stroke. The Journal, 
published this letter in August 1916 when it received it in a sensational opinion piece titled ‘Voice from 
the Dead’ condemning India’s ‘cheesepairing policy’. ‘A Voice From the Dead’, British Medical 
Journal, 19 Aug. 1916, pp. 261-2. 
134
 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of Lloyd George, London, Odhams, 1938, vol. 1, pp. 488-95.  
135
 ‘Mesopotamia: The War and the Indian Government’, Letter to the Editor by H. S. Barnes, The 
Times, Friday, 31 Mar. 1916, p. 9. Barnes was foreign secretary to the Indian government (1900-3), 
during which time he dealt with Persian affairs, he also served on the Council of India in the India 
Office (1905-13), after which he developed considerable stakes in middle-eastern oil and banking 
concerns and played an influential role in retaining British commitment in the region after the First 
World War. See Frances Bostock, ‘Barnes, Sir Hugh Shakespear (1853–1940)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/53561, 
accessed 14 Nov 2015]. 
136
 Bruce Seton, ‘Causes of Breakdown’, ‘Letters to the Editor’, The Times, 30 Jun. 1917. 
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Fleetwood Wilson being reputed to have boasted at the end of his term in India ‘Thank 
God. I’ve bled the Army white.’
137
 Others pointed to the long-standing policy of 
retrenchment in military expenditure as manifested, for instance, in the Nicholson 
Commission (1913) charged by the Asquith government with the brief to reduce 
military expenditure in India just before the war, of which Meyer had been a 
member.
138
 Such strictures on Meyer and the colonial state showed no awareness of 
the fact that the systemic neglect in the Indian army was the result of a peculiar pattern 
of colonial finance, which gave the military first call on the government’s budget but 
also sought to curtail its ever-burgeoning demands.
139
 Nor were they aware that this 
form of finance led to much greater defence expenditure in colonial India, while 
starving expenditure on infrastructure and welfare. The Times attributed the 
viciousness of the attacks on Meyer partly to prejudice towards his German-sounding 
surname.
140
 
The Mesopotamia Commission Report’s attention to the Indian finance department 
was clearly linked to the outcry in the conservative British press about India’s failure 
to contribute adequately to the defence of the British Empire.
141
 The report revealed 
that the shortcomings of the medical arrangements had been the result of 
mismanagement by army authorities and the constant scrutiny by the finance 
 
137
 Letter to the Editor, ‘Experience’, The Times, 3 Jul. 1917, p. 9. 
138
 Mentioned in Letter to the Editor, ‘Civilian’, The Times, 3 Jul. 1917, p. 9; ‘Constructive Army 
Reform in India’, The Times, 6 Jul. 1917, p. 7; ‘The Aga Khan’s Views’, The Times, 23 Jul. 1917, p. 5. 
This commission was merely one in a long series that sought to reduce army expenditure. For example, 
the Army Organization Commission of 1879 was meant to propose retrenchments in military 
expenditure after its sharp increase during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. 
139 Sehrawat, Colonial Medical Care, esp. pp. 219-31. 
140
 ‘Responsibilities in Mesopotamia’, The Times, 14 Jul. 1916, p. 9. Privately, the editor of The Times 
was far more hostile, commenting on Meyer’s unsuitability for the office of Finance Member, given 
that he was a ‘a Jew and the son of a German missionary…[who] ought never to have had his present 
job’, G. Dawson to Northcliffe, 14 Jul. 1916, Northcliffe Papers, Add MS 62251, p. 142.  In defending 
Meyer, Chamberlain’s views converged with the public line adopted by The Times, Letter from Austen 
Chamberlain to John Hewett, 29 Mar. 1916, Austen Chamberlain Collection, AC46/2/21. 
141
 The Mesopotamia Commission blamed the Indian government for causing the medical breakdown 
by failing to provide adequate river and other transport to supply the expedition and due to the impact 
of the Kitchener reforms (1903-9). Mesopotamia Commission Report, 1917, Cd. 8610, [henceforth, 
Mesopotamia Commission Report], pp. 10, 48-9. 
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department of the Indian government over details of military medical expenditure. 
This observance of ‘due economy’ was a direct result of the close financial 
supervision of military expenditure by civilian authorities as well as a military 
bureaucracy aimed at curbing it.
142
  
The Morning Post was to push the opinion that ‘the financial resources of India 
should be expended in the cause of Empire’ to its fullest extent.
143
 It characterized 
India as lacking in ‘patriotic spirit’ at a time when ‘the whole British Empire – India 
included – [was] fighting for dear life against the most formidable foe which has ever 
arisen.’
144
 It claimed that ‘though India is rolling in wealth, not a penny is allowed to 
be raised for the common cause. Even the elementary wants of our wounded and 
suffering soldiers cannot be met.’
145
 The Indian government’s failure to raise an 
internal war loan to meet the costs of the war was roundly criticized in the 
conservative British press. This reflected a wider shift in emphasis in British home 
front propaganda away from valorising the sacrifice of life to sacrificing resources, 
with an increased emphasis on the need to raise funds through war loans and savings 
schemes.
146
 British imperial organizations such as the British Empire Union critical of 
the finance policy of the Indian government demanded that India ‘show her patriotism 
by raising a War Loan to help the Empire’. It criticized the failure of the Indian 
government to raise revenue for the imperial war effort by imposing a high income tax 
and a ‘super tax’ on jute, tea and iron firms that were making ‘enormous profits out of 
 
142 Mesopotamia Commission Report, p. 81 
143
 ‘Absolootely Nootral’, Morning Post, 21 Oct. 1916, p. 6. 
144
 Ibid. 
145
 Ibid. 
146 Haste, Keep the Home Fires, p. 77. For an expanded discussion of the changing meaning of the term 
‘sacrifice’ and its malleability in British social and political life during the war, see Gregory, Last Great 
War, pp. 112-86. On war loans see ibid., pp. 220-35. 
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the war’.
147
 So effective was this criticism that by the close of 1916, the secretary of 
state for India was questioned in Parliament about the inadequacy of India’s 
contribution to the war effort.
148
 
Although it was universally acknowledged that the Indian government’s policy of 
economy had been responsible for the severe breakdown of the campaign, the grounds 
on which the colonial government was criticized by both the British press and the 
Commission deserve closer attention. The British press and the Commission 
proceeded alike from the assumption that the colonial state had failed to treat the 
resources of India as an extended imperial home front from which men and resources 
should have been extracted in the same way as they were being drawn from Britain or 
the settler colonies. These assumptions have been unreflexively reproduced in much 
of the historiography of the campaign, which often ends up assigning responsibility to 
the Indian government for its failure to commandeer men and resources sufficiently to 
ensure the success of the campaign.
149
  
Such a skewed perspective ignores that colonial India could not be characterized as 
a ‘home front’ in the same way as Britain, Australia or Canada. Neither were Indian 
resources at the disposal of a British government in a manner comparable to the settler 
colonies. Indian finances were much more heavily committed to imperial defence in 
peace time than in the settler colonies. Increasing economic demands during the war 
deepened the danger of straining the colonial regime in India both economically and 
politically. The threat of invasion never loomed as large over the Indian ‘home front’ 
as it did in Britain. It was difficult to explain to Indian subjects as to why they should 
make contributions to the war in the form of subscriptions to war charities or through 
 
147
 ‘India and the War’, Letter from FEC Carr, Honorary Secretary, British Empire Union, Morning 
Post, 25 Oct. 1916. 
148
 SoS to Viceroy, 13 Nov. 1916, ‘Letters, 1916’, Chelmsford Papers, Mss Eur/E264/2, p. 309. 
149
 Davis’s Ends and Means is especially liable. 
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a war loan raised by the government since the defence of the empire had no tangible 
benefit for a people governed without representation and since most had no friends or 
family fighting on the front.
150
 As excessive military expenditure in India had been 
criticized by nationalists for decades before the First World War, expanding it to meet 
the demands of the Mesopotamia expedition without devolving power to Indians was 
to court political disaster. Indeed, in contrast with the Northcliffe press and arch-
conservative newspapers like the Morning Post, sections of the liberal press conceded 
that the Indian contribution to the war, especially in the early phase, had been 
considerable. The liberal Daily News acknowledged that the pre-war push for 
economy criticized by the Mesopotamia Commission had resulted from the fact that 
military expenditure constituted one-third of India’s revenue while Britain’s 
expenditure on its military before the war had been less than one-sixth its revenue.
151
 
Indeed, defence expenditure in India had risen by 300 per cent during the war.
152
 Such 
admissions were nevertheless rare even in liberal newspapers, which hardly covered 
the ‘Mesopotamia scandal’.
153
  
Demands for the raising of a war loan in India were to have significant political 
repercussions in South Asia, which are assessed in the next section. It is argued that 
the impact of the scandal accelerated reform of the colonial Indian administration, 
which led to the devolution of power under the Montagu-Chelmsford Act of 1919. 
Such was the sensitivity of the colonial administration to the British press that both the 
 
150
 Most of the recruitment in the Indian army was concentrated in a few regions in the north. Omissi, 
Sepoys and the Raj, pp. 38-40; Yong, Garrison State, pp. 98-140. 
151
 Editorial: ‘Lord Hardinge’s Defence’, Daily News, 4 Jul. 1917, p. 2. 
152
 Sarkar, Modern India, p. 169. 
153
 Some coverage was given to questions and statements in the Parliament regarding the breakdown 
during 1916, but these were on a much smaller scale than in the conservative and Northcliffe press. See 
for instance, ‘Our Mesopotamian Troops: An “Inexcusable” Medical Breakdown’, Manchester 
Guardian, 23 Mar. 1916, p. 5; ‘House of Lords: The Mesopotamia “Breakdown”’, Ibid., 19 Jul. 1916, 
p. 6; ‘Indian Troop Train Tragedy: Many Deaths from Heatstroke’, Ibid., 22 Jul. 1916, p. 6; ‘Many 
Deaths on Hospital Ship: Terrible Effects of Heat’, Ibid., 8 Aug. 1916, p. 5; Mesopotamia Scandal: The 
Late Sir V. Horsley’s Criticisms’, Ibid., 18 Aug. 1916, p. 6; ‘Who is Responsible?’, Star, 23 Mar. 1916, 
p. 2; ‘Mesopotamia: More Questions about the Hospital Arrangements’, Ibid., 29 Mar. 1916, p. 1. 
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liberal and conservative remedies to the scandal were adopted even as it sought to 
suppress news of the breakdown in India through censorship. Despite this, the Indian 
press was strident in its rejection of the right-wing press’s strictures on the inadequacy 
of India’s war effort. As the next section demonstrates, the Indian nationalist press’s 
riposte to the conservative press was surprisingly in tandem with colonial officials 
such as Meyer and the Pioneer, which was sympathetic to the colonial state. In 
considering the long-term impact of the ‘Mesopotamia muddle’, the next section 
concludes by examining the unanticipated consequences of the war loan, especially in 
spurring on anti-colonial protests in 1919. It will also examine how historiography on 
the Mesopotamia campaign has tended to echo the conservative British press’s 
preoccupation with assessing the objectivity of the Mesopotamia Commission and the 
culpability of the various political figures caught up in the scandal.   
The Long Shadow of the Mesopotamia Scandal in Colonial India  
On 20 August 1917, barely a month after the resignation of Chamberlain, the new 
Secretary of State for India, the radical Liberal Edwin Montagu,
154
 made a declaration 
regarding colonial policy which was to have very significant repercussions for anti-
colonial nationalist politics.
155
 The Government of India Act of 1919, which emerged 
from his declaration and hastened the devolution of power to Indians through 
Dyarchy, has been studied at length.
156
 Although constitutional reforms were being 
considered by the Indian colonial state since 1915, an important driver for the 
announcement and its timing was the desire to make political concessions that would 
 
154 Montagu had been the under-secretary of state for India (1910-14) in Asquith’s government. 
155
 Hansard, Commons Debates, 5th ser., vol. 97, cols. 1695: 20 Aug. 1917. 
156
 Robb, Government of India and Reform; Shane Ryland, ‘Edwin Montagu in India, 1917-18: Politics 
of the MontaguChelmsford report’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 79-
92; R. J. Moore, Liberalism and Indian Politics, 1872-1922, London: Edward Arnold, 1966; 
S. Legg, ‘Dyarchy: Democracy, Autocracy and the Scalar Sovereignty of Interwar India’, Comparative 
Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, 36, no. 1, 2016, pp. 44–65. 
Page 38 of 56
Cambridge University Press
Modern Asian Studies
For Review Only
39 
 
 
sustain the Indian war effort.
157
 In 1917 demands for the reform of the Indian military 
administration had been raised in Parliament, with increased pressure on the India 
Office and the highest echelons of the Indian government.
158
 Although Chamberlain 
explicitly disavowed any attempts to make the discussion of the Mesopotamia 
Commission Report into ‘the text for a great Debate upon the future of the Indian 
Empire’, Montagu asserted that the Mesopotamia debacle required extensive reform of 
the Indian government.
159
 Indeed, Montagu’s criticism of the colonial Indian 
government as a ‘statute-ridden machine… [which] was too wooden, inelastic, and 
antediluvian’ echoed the conservative press’s trope of ‘hill-top government’.
160
 
Montagu’s views on the need to politicize the colonial administration, which had 
governed bureaucratically and despotically, also echoed the liberal British press’s 
coverage of the deficiencies of Indian government in 1916 and 1917. Both the 
Manchester Guardian and Star claimed that the debacle in Mesopotamia was due to 
the ‘autocratic’ nature of the Indian government, which needed greater public 
scrutiny.
161
 Although their analysis varied in tone and emphasis, liberal newspapers 
suggested that making the Indian government responsible to Indian public opinion was 
the surest means of avoiding such scandals in the future.
162
 The minority report by 
Josiah Wedgwood was quoted approvingly for recommending that  
 
157
 Phillip Woods, ‘The MontaguChelmsford reforms (1919): A re assessment’, South Asia: Journal 
of South Asian Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, 1994, pp. 25-42. 
158
 SoS to Viceroy, 14 Feb. 1917, ‘Letters to and from the SoS for India’, vol. II, 1917, Chelmsford 
Papers, India Office Private Papers, BL, Mss Eur/E264/3, pp. 46-7. 
159
 ‘Court of Inquiry’, Hansard, Commons Debates, 5th ser., vol. 95, col. 2211: 12 Jul. 1917. 
160
 ‘Court of Inquiry’, Hansard, Commons Debates, 5th ser., vol. 95, col. 2205: 12 Jul. 1917. Montagu’s 
characterization of the Indian government won him fulsome press in the Indian nationalist press: ‘Home 
Rule for India’, Abhyudaya, 13 Jul. 1917, Selections from Indian-owned Newspapers Published in the 
United Provinces, no. 29 of 1917, p.p. 423-4. 
161
 ‘Mesopotamia’, Manchester Guardian, 28 Jun. 1917, p. 4; H. E. A. Cotton, ‘Mesopotamia: An 
Impeachment of India’s Bureaucracy’, Star, 29 Jun. 1917, p. 2. 
162 The thrust of liberal newspapers’ discussion of the Commission privileged the reform of the 
machinery of colonial governance, though some liberal newspapers like the Daily News and Daily 
Chronicle joined in demands for punishment of individual politicians and administrators.
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we should no longer deny to Indians “the full privileges of citizenship”; but 
should allow them a large share in the government of their own country and in 
the control of that Bureaucracy which in this war, uncontrolled by public 
opinion, has failed to rise to British standards.
163
  
While some of this evoked conservative papers’ denunciation of the Indian 
government as ‘hill top government’, the emphasis was not on demanding a greater 
contribution from India but on acknowledging that the Indian government could not 
commit further resources to the war effort because it was not answerable to those it 
ruled. The Daily News carried an article by Nihal Singh arguing that the 
‘Mesopotamia failure’ could have been avoided if Indian administrators had not lived 
in ‘splendid isolation, aloof from the people in whose name they act’.
164
 Quality 
liberal newspapers repeatedly referred to constitutional reform being imminent when 
reporting parliamentary discussions of the Commission.
165
 Given the support of the 
Liberal press for Irish demands for home rule, it was not surprising that it tended to 
lean towards sympathetic coverage of the Indian Home Rule League Movement rather 
than baiting Indian administrators and attacking the Asquith coalition.
166
  
The impact of British opinion – both conservative and liberal – on the colonial 
administration was considerable. Questioning in Parliament on the continuing 
                                                                                                                                       
‘Mesopotamia’, Manchester Guardian, 28 Jun. 1917, p. 4; ‘Crime and Punishment’, Daily News, 28 
Jun. 1917, p. 2; ‘Editorial: Mesopotamia - Blames Fair and Unfair’, Daily Chronicle, 28 Jun. 1917, p. 2. 
163
 ‘The Mesopotamia Report’, Manchester Guardian, 27 Jun. 1917, p. 5; H. E. A. Cotton, 
‘Mesopotamia: An Impeachment of India’s Bureaucracy’, Star, 29 Jun. 1917, p. 2; ‘Mesopotamia’, 
Daily News, 27 Jun. 1917, p. 2; Letter to Editor by Joshua Wedgwood, ‘The war office and the nation’, 
Daily News, 27 Jun. 1917, p. 2. 
164
 Nihal Singh, ‘The Mesopotamia Failure’, Daily News, 12 Jul. 1917, p. 2. Nihal Singh was a prolific 
contributor to British, American an Indian publications, with links to various Indian nationalists and 
published several books on India’s contribution to the British war effort, 
[http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/makingbritain/content/saint-nihal-singh, accessed 14 Aug. 
2016]. 
165
 ‘To-morrow’s Mesopotamia Debate’, Manchester Guardian, 12 Jul. 1917, p. 4; ‘Mesopotamia: Lord 
Hardinge to Make a Statement To-day’, Daily News, 3 Jul. 1917, p. 1. 
166 Kaul has analysed Montagu’s concerted efforts to secure the support of the London press to create a 
more receptive environment in Britain for the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919. Kaul, Reporting 
the Raj, pp. 135-47; 175-98. 
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inadequacy of medical arrangements in Mesopotamia had proved extremely 
embarrassing for the secretary of state for India throughout 1916 and 1917, as 
Chamberlain admitted to Chelmsford: 
I am told that nothing will restrain the House of Lords from debating the conduct 
of the [Mesopotamian] expedition, next week. Everyone is receiving letters 
speaking of the inadequacy of the supplies and of the hardship which the force is 
still suffering. Public opinion here is strongly roused upon the subject…. I largely 
share their feeling of indignation at what I must regard as the lack of foresight and 
enterprise shown in the organization and supply of the forces.
167
  
The military secretary of the India Office, E.G. Barrow, characterized the Morning 
Post’s news coverage of official ‘muddles’ regarding medical arrangements for 
soldiers as ‘particularly venomous’.
168
 What were characterized as ‘very savage’ 
newspaper attacks on hospital administration in India, especially by the Morning Post, 
continued through October and November 1916.
169
 Chamberlain frequently pressed 
the Indian government to respond to complaints and news reports, for instance, 
regarding overcrowding in army hospitals in Bombay and Coonoor.
170
 Chamberlain 
was very sensitive towards private reports of poor medical arrangements: ‘I am very 
uneasy. These reports reach home in private letters. It was in this way that I first came 
to know of the Mesopotamia breakdown, and I fear the repetition of a similar scandal 
in India.’
171 
Viceroy Chelmsford felt that the ‘attitude of distrust’ towards the Indian 
 
167
 SoS to Viceroy, 12 Jul. 1916, ‘Letters to and from the SoS for India, 1916’, [henceforth ‘Letters, 
1916’], Chelmsford Papers, Mss Eur/E264/2, p. 157. See ‘Mesopotamian Expedition’, House of Lords 
Debate, 20 Jul. 1916, vol. 22, cc.835-74. 
168
 Demi-official note by E.G. Barrow, 26 Oct. 1916, Private Papers of E.G. Barrow, Mss Eur/E420/14, 
IORPP, BL, London, [henceforth, Barrow papers], p. 36. 
169
 Viceroy to SoS, 12 Oct. 1916, ibid., p. 339. Viceroy to SoS, 10 Nov. 1916, ibid., p. 406. 
170  Telegram no. 216 from SoS to Viceroy, 4 Aug. 1916, ‘Telegrams, 1916’, Chelmsford Papers, Mss 
Eur/E264/7, p. 71. Telegram no. 235 from SoS to Viceroy, 16 Aug. 1916, ibid., p. 77. 
171
 Telegram no. 238 from SoS to Viceroy, 16 Jul. 1916, ibid., p. 78. 
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government fostered by such news reports in Britain was ‘gravely embarrassing’.
172
 
The well-established trope of the Indian medical scandal and its deployment in the 
press exerted considerable pressure for reform at the highest levels of Indian 
government, with the viceroy admitting to concern about reports ‘on the alleged 
scandals with regard to soldiers returning from Mesopotamia. I have to keep a 
constant eye on them, as correspondence goes home and then you are troubled and 
everybody else is troubled.’
173
 The India Office was also alive to the Post’s 
‘agitation… against the Government of India and Sir William Meyer’.
174
 Chelmsford 
concurred that there existed ‘a considerable agitation’ in the British Tory press, 
especially in the Morning Post, against the Indian government.
175
 
Before turning to consider how the conservative British press’s loud criticism led to 
the imposition of a war loan in India, it is important to acknowledge here that this was 
accompanied by a concerted effort to restrict the flow of information to India 
regarding the breakdowns in the campaign. The severe censorship of the press in India 
was considered important to shield the colonial regime from news of public criticism 
of the Indian government and the setting up of the Commission to investigate the 
breakdown.
176
 
The chairman of the Commission, George Hamilton, ensured that the Commission 
did not go to India as this would have made it ‘the receptacle of every conceivable 
gossip and complaint. Its operations… [would] seriously impair the authority and 
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 Telegram no. 294a from Viceroy to SoS, 13 Sep. 1916, ibid., p. 135. SoS to Viceroy, 16 Aug. 1916, 
‘Letters, 1916’, Chelmsford Papers, Mss Eur/E264/2, p. 220. 
173
 Viceroy to SoS, dated 6 Oct. 1916, ibid., p. 324. 
174
 Demi-official note by E.G. Barrow, 26 Oct. 1916, Private Papers of E.G. Barrow, Mss Eur/E420/14, 
IORPP, BL, London, [henceforth, Barrow papers], p. 36. 
175 Letter from Viceroy to SoS, 10 Nov. 1916, ‘Letters, 1916’, Chelmsford Papers, Mss Eur/E264/2, p. 
406. 
176
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undermine the prestige of the Government….’
177
 Chamberlain too felt that the enquiry 
would amount to ‘the trial of high officers of Government of India [which] would be 
fraught with grave dangers to the authorities of your [Indian] government if it takes 
place in the presence of Indian public….’
178
 Despite such precautions, in his speech to 
the Imperial Legislative Assembly in 1916, Chelmsford had to admit that the 
‘breakdown on the medical side in Mesopotamia had brought a storm of obloquy on 
[the] Indian administration.’
179
 This was especially embarrassing when he spoke to 
raise funds for the war effort.
180
  
Press censorship in India sought to suppress news about parliamentary debates 
critical of the Indian government’s official machinery following the publication of the 
Mesopotamia Commission’s report. Chamberlain was all too aware that the 
Mesopotamia Commission’s report laid the Indian government open to criticism in 
India at the height of the Home Rule League movement
181
 and Viceroy Chelmsford 
expressed his dismay at the report’s ‘disastrous effect upon the position and prestige 
of the Government of India… [as] it comes at a peculiarly unfortunate time when the 
Government of India is face to face with a big political agitation…’.
182
 Parliamentary 
 
177 Copy of a private and confidential letter from Chamberlain to Lord G. Hamilton, 25 Sep. 1916, 
enclosed in letter from SoS to Viceroy, 21 Sep. 1916, ‘Letters to and from the SoS for India, 1916’, 
Chelmsford Papers, Mss Eur/E264/2, p. 270. 
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 Telegram no. 324 from SoS to Viceroy, 27 Sep. 1916, ‘Telegrams to and from the SoS for India, 
1916’ [henceforth ‘Telegrams, 1916’], Chelmsford Papers, Mss Eur/E264/7, p. 106. 
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 Chelmsford, ‘Speech to First Meeting of the Imperial Legislative Council, Simla Session, 1916’, 5 
Sep. 1916, Speeches by Lord Chelmsford, Viceroy and Governor General of India (Simla: Government 
Monotype Press, 1919), p. 65, and ‘Speech to Last meeting of the Imperial Legislative Council, Delhi 
Session, 1916-17’, 23 Mar. 1917, ibid., p. 289. 
180
 Chelmsford, ‘Speech at Annual General Meeting of St. John Ambulance Association in Simla’, 27 
Jun. 1917, ibid., p. 365. 
181
 SoS to Viceroy, 5 Jul. 1917, ‘Letters to and from the SoS for India, 1917’, [henceforth ‘Letters, 
1917’], Chelmsford Papers, Mss Eur/E264/3, p. 143.  
182
 Viceroy to SoS, 7 Jul. 1917, ‘Letters, 1917’, Chelmsford Papers, Mss Eur/E264/3, p. 219. ‘[I]n 
India, as in England, it was recognised that the report of the Mesopotamia Commission had had a 
“disastrous” effect on the government’s prestige. Meston reported that “the air has never been thicker 
with suspicion”; he believed that “the anti-Government and almost anti-British feeling among the 
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misunderstandings are spreading into wider circles….”’ Robb, Government of India and Reform, p. 73. 
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criticism of the Indian government was not reported by Reuters either,
183
 but Indian 
newspapers were aware both of the censorship and expected to find out more through 
British newspapers which would arrive after a delay in the post by sea. The Capital 
derisively quipped that news about the reception of the Mesopotamia Commission 
may never reach India if the post carrying English newspapers was fortuitously sunk 
due to enemy action.
184
 Indian newspapers condemned deliberate attempts by the 
press censor at Simla to omit news critical of the ‘authors of the Mesopotamia 
muddle’ while privileging opinion repudiating the Commission.
185
 Another newspaper 
asserted that ‘the whole truth about the [Mesopotamia] bungle’ had not been told due 
to the press’s fear of the use of the Defence of India Act against them.
186
   
Having considered the role of the British press’s critique of the colonial 
administration in accelerating reform and devolution, it is worth considering the other 
important development arising from this critique which was to hasten the development 
of anti-colonial nationalism: the demands to raise a war loan in India. These demands 
had accompanied the influential criticism by the conservative British press of the 
finance member, Meyer, in particular and were to play an important role in stoking 
anti-colonial protests in 1919. This growing anti-colonial nationalism in India was 
accompanied by the redefinition of Britishness and imperial citizenship across the 
empire, producing imperial fault lines reflected in the very different postures adopted 
towards Meyer in the British and Indian press. Indian newspapers’ responses to British 
conservative papers’ tirade against Meyer’s financial policies in India during the war 
were significantly different.  
 
183
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The British conservative press’s criticism of Meyer was reprised in the more 
conservative ‘Anglo-Indian’ press, that is, newspapers in India which represented the 
views of the British community based in India. This included the Capital, which was 
vehement in its criticism of Hardinge, Chamberlain and Meyer after the publication of 
the Commission’s Report.
187
 The animosity towards Meyer arose because he had 
introduced an income tax during the war which was unpopular with the British 
community in India.
188
  
Although Indian newspapers made use of the tropes of ‘hill-top government’ and 
‘Mesopotamia muddle’ to disparage the colonial government despite their divergent 
political leanings, there was considerable hostility within the Indian nationalist press 
to demands made by conservative British newspapers for increased contributions to 
the war. Indian newspapers took exception to the British press’s insufficient 
acknowledgement of the considerable sacrifices made by Indian people to the war 
effort.
189
 Some Indian newspapers demanded that greater publicity be given to India’s 
contribution in men and material during the war to counter the British press’s 
criticism.
190
 Senior colonial administrators claimed that this criticism ignored the 
considerable funds that India had already committed to the war.
191
 The Leader 
claimed that ‘the petty, spiteful, attacks of the Anglo-foreign press are strongly 
resented throughout the country’.
192
  
 
187
 ‘A Ditcher’s Diary, Capital, 20 Jul. 1917, press cutting in Guy Fleetwood Wilson Private Papers, 
IORPP, BL, London [henceforth, Fleetwood Wilson Papers], Mss Eur/E224/28-9. 
188
 ‘A Ditcher’s Diary’, Capital, 20 Jul. 1917, p. 122. Indian nationalist newspapers, on the other hand, 
were extremely supportive of what they perceived as Meyer’s targeting of the British community in 
India to increase revenues for the first time. See, for example, ‘Sir W. Meyer and the Anglo-Indian 
Press’, Kisan, 20 Oct. 1916, SINP, vol. 29, no. 44, p. 870. 
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 See for example, news reports asserting that the Indian government’s contribution to the war was 
entirely adequate: ‘India’s Contribution to the Cost of the War’, Punjabee, 2 and 3 Mar. 1917; Tribune, 
3 Mar. 1917, SINP, vol. 30, no. 10, pp. 177-8. 
190 Gujrati, 10 Sep. 1916, RINP, no. 38, p. 10. 
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192
 Leader, 18 Jul. 1917, SINUP, no. 29, p. 422. 
Page 45 of 56
Cambridge University Press
Modern Asian Studies
For Review Only
46 
 
 
The raising of an internal war loan in India had been precluded in the first two years 
of war due to the emphasis in Indian finance on balanced budgets. The Indian colonial 
state was painfully aware that the nationalist critique of the economic impact of 
excessive military expenditure by the colonial state had made it increasingly difficult 
to service the needs of the metropolis while holding on to Britain’s political and 
economic dominance in India. Meyer and the finance department’s measures to curb 
Indian military expenditure, which were lamented in the British press and condemned 
by the Mesopotamia Commission Report had emerged from a system of regulating the 
ever-expanding military expenditure of colonial India, which had been a matter of 
concern since the eighteenth century. On the one hand, as the ultimate guarantor of 
British rule in India, the military had maintained a preeminent claim on the resources 
extracted by the colonial regime.
193
 On the other, to check the possibility of creating 
large deficits due to costly colonial wars, over the nineteenth century, a system of 
surveilling military expenditure had been developed. The emphasis on balancing 
budgets and fiscal prudence had initially emerged from persistent criticism of 
excessive military expenditure by the expanding colonial state since the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
194
  
The Pioneer, which was considered ‘the organ of the Indian government’, thus 
responded to attacks regarding the insufficiency of India’s war effort by asserting that 
the financial requirements of the army had been fully and readily supplied by the 
Indian finance department.
195
 Given that the colonial administration was keen not to 
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provide further ballast to economic nationalist critiques of British rule as 
impoverishing India through heedless extraction of resources, it is not surprising that 
Indian nationalist newspapers also contested claims in British conservative 
newspapers that India was ‘an untouched mine of gold’, whose resources had not been 
sufficiently channelled into the British war effort.
196
 Nationalist newspapers in India, 
such as the Tribune, argued that given India’s impoverishment, its contribution to the 
war had been severely taxing. It decried criticism in the British press of the colonial 
government for not having provided even greater financial help.
197
 
Yet, before the war, Meyer had been at the receiving end of trenchant criticism by 
nationalist Indian newspapers for implementing balanced budgets which were 
accompanied by low expenditure on education and other ‘ameliorative services’ 
‘beneficial’ to Indian taxpayers.
198
 On this, he had been at loggerheads not merely 
with nationalists but also colonial administrators such as John Hewett, who had been 
associated with the development of industries in the United Provinces in the pre-war 
period and had found the experience of working with Meyer frustrating due to the 
latter’s disregard of ‘matters of cardinal importance connected with the development 
of India.’
199
 The tendency to check military expenditure had been further exacerbated 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century due to Indian nationalist criticism of 
such expenditure as wasteful since it served to buttress the empire, but did not leave 
enough resources for ‘developing’ India.
200
 In the face of nationalist criticism, finance 
 
196 The Tribune pointed out that such claims revealed the ignorance of some retired Indian officials 
writing to the British press and criticized ‘their misrepresentation of India to British people’. ‘India’s 
supposed wealth’, Tribune, 14 May 1916, SINP, vol. 29, no. 19, p. 379; Hamdam, 13 Oct. 1916, 
Selections from Indian Owned Newspapers in the United Provinces, no. 42, p. 938. Indeed, 
Chamberlain himself had pointed out that selective quoting of the Commission’s report by newspapers 
like the Daily Mail would misinform public opinion regarding Indian issues.  
197
 See, for instance, Tribune (Lahore), 6 Sep. 1917, SINP, vol. 30, no. 37, p. 721.  
198
 ‘The Budget and Education’, Punjabee, 21 Mar. 1914, SINP, vol. 27, no. 13, pp. 346-7. 
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members were able to claim that India’s material progress was proceeding 
satisfactorily by showing a balanced budget. Gladstonian principles, which had 
become pillars of Indian public finance, valorised anaemic levels of public 
expenditure, balanced budgets, eliminating the national debt by devoting budgetary 
surpluses to it and stringent control over government expenditure.
201
 This emphasis on 
balancing budgets meant that only those ‘developmental’ schemes would be 
considered for finance by the colonial state which were expected to yield a profit.
202
 
Thus, it might have been reasonable to suppose that the Indian nationalist press would 
join the conservative British press in criticizing Meyer as this same principle had 
brought him under attack for his rejection of the proposal to build a railway in 
Mesopotamia, which had worsened the shortage of medical supplies at the front.
203
 
Under attack from the conservative press for having made an inadequate 
contribution to the war effort, Meyer sought to strike a chord with Indian nationalists 
when he claimed that ‘We do not think …[the Tory and Northcliffe press] will ever be 
satisfied until the last drop of India’s blood is sucked.’
204
 Although Meyer claimed 
that ‘[t]he Government of India have no… excuse to be influenced to far-reaching 
decisions by the mean, misinformed and misdirected criticisms of the Northcliffe deal 
in England and India’,
205
 he introduced an internal war loan in India in March 1917.
206
 
His proposal to make a special contribution of £100 million to the war on behalf of the 
                                                                                                                                       
the need of curtailing Indian military expenditure in the late nineteenth century, see Bipan Chandra, 
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Indian government was also meant to silence criticism in the British press. As Meyer 
explained in a speech to an Indian audience, the Indian government’s financial 
contribution to the British war effort was increased in direct response to criticism in 
the British press: 
We have been subjected to much criticism in certain quarters for not 
contributing more than we have done…. [T]hese … are the organs of the Tory 
Press in England, which are the tools in the hands of the Northcliffe deal and 
that section of the press in this country which is in the leading-strings of that 
deal….
207
 
Such statements did not, however, prevent Indian newspapers from criticizing 
imperial control of Indian finances and the pre-eminence of the British over Indian 
press in determining Indian financial policy: ‘While it [the colonial government] has 
shown remarkable activity in unjustly putting down the Indian press and platform, an 
impression prevails largely, that it is helpless before the strong influentially backed 
organs of the English and Anglo-Indian Press.’
208
 Nationalist critics of colonial rule 
played upon the widening gap between the imperial rhetoric of ‘material progress’ and 
the economic hardships produced by the diversion of Indian revenues into the war 
effort. The additional financial burden imposed by the loan was criticized by Indian 
nationalist newspapers, which denounced the drowning out of demands for ‘schemes 
of development’ by the ‘din of war’.
209
  
Thus, the two war loans in India were introduced in a significantly different 
political atmosphere from that which gave rise to the initial spurt of protestations of 
loyalty by Indian political leaders. By 1916, such protestations had given way to the 
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more militant agitation of the Home Rule League movements. These were to be 
followed immediately after the war by waves of growing political protests against the 
colonial state, fuelled considerably by the economic hardship created by the war and 
forced contributions to the war effort.
 210 
The Indian war loans opened in March 1917 
and June 1918 collectively raised £75 million.
211
 Collections from a public weary of 
contributing to the war effort and unwilling to contribute further were marked by 
official coercion. Vernacular newspapers, despite the punitive censorship, reported 
this coercion.
212
 As the Hindusthan asked rhetorically: ‘Is it right to make the war loan 
a success by resorting to terrorism?’
213
 Indeed, so marked was the frustration of the 
Indian public with increased war collections that ‘Our Day’ collections announced 
towards the end of 1917 were widely characterized as ‘Aur de’, which translated as 
‘give more’.
214
 Several witnesses to the committee investigating the 1919 disturbances 
claimed that these had emerged from dissatisfaction with the colonial administration, 
arising partly from the use of force to increase subscription to the war loans.
215
 Fazl-i-
Husain, an important political leader in the Punjab, called these forced contributions 
‘compulsory voluntary aid’,
216
 while another witness testified that ‘people were 
bullied, beaten and coerced’ to raise funds for war loans Punjab.
217
 This coercion was 
seen to have directly fed into the ‘Rowlatt disturbances’ in April 1919 – characterized 
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as ‘the biggest and most violent anti-British upsurge which India had seen since 
1857’.
218
 During the protests, crowds attacked symbols of British authority such as 
post offices and railway stations across much of Punjab and in several cities, including 
Lahore, Amritsar, Delhi, Ahmedabad, Calcutta and Bombay.
219
 These protests and 
their suppression marked a turning point in the anti-colonial nationalist movement – 
they were followed by an era of mass nationalist protests, such as those during the 
Non-Cooperation Movement of 1920-22. Similarly, India’s economic relationship 
with Britain underwent a marked transformation after the war which meant that only 
the most ingenious financial manipulation could allow Britain to generate economic 
benefits from India.
220
 
Despite the existence of this rich history of trans-national connections between 
propaganda, news, war and politics, historians examining the Mesopotamia Campaign 
have tended to restrict their analysis to themes that dominated the reporting of the 
Mesopotamia breakdown. While the criticism by the Indian press of demands for an 
increased contribution to the war effort has not found its way to the historiography of 
the Mesopotamian scandal, the British press’s demand for punishment of colonial 
officials such as Hardinge and criticism of the Indian government has been widely 
featured in the scholarship of the campaign.
221
 Historiography on the Mesopotamia 
campaign and Commission has tended to focus on the veracity of its findings and 
whether or not responsibility for the breakdown was correctly apportioned.
222
 In an 
early study of the campaign, A. J. Barker’s claim that the Mesopotamia Commission 
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report was politically motivated seemed to reprise debates in the British press 
regarding who was ultimately at blame for the breakdown – the British or ‘home’ 
government, the colonial Indian administration or the ‘men on the spot’. He argues 
that the restriction of the terms of the commission to the period before the British 
authorities took charge indicates that any blame for the breakdown would be laid at 
the door of the Indian government, and the British government’s conduct of the war 
would not be scrutinized. Barker suggests that the Commission failed to take into 
account the logistical difficulties of organizing a campaign in the difficult terrain of 
the region.
223
 Both Paul Davis and John Galbraith have also resuscitated discussion in 
the British press regarding who was to blame for the breakdown in the campaign. 
Davis disagrees significantly with Barker regarding the Commission being politically 
skewed, but nevertheless frames his discussion of it in terms set out in the British 
press during the war.
224
 The impetus of some of this historiography comes from initial 
characterizations of the Commission as a whitewashing exercise in the conservative 
British press, which was expected to pin individual responsibility for systemic failures 
on politicians or senior administrators. Other historical assessments have examined the 
light that the campaign can throw on the fall of the Asquith government and British 
politics of the time.
225
 A narrow focus on such themes unwittingly reproduces the 
imperial biases of the British conservative press. Although the Northcliffe press’s 
coverage of the Mesopotamia breakdown was meant to embarrass Asquith, and 
undermine his government, the fallout of the Commission’s findings for the Indian 
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government was considerable and deserves to be analysed for a better understanding 
of the significance of the war for economic and political developments in India. The 
focus needs to shift away from these longstanding concerns about the campaign or an 
assessment of individual figures towards the interweaving of these histories with 
developments in colonial South Asia.  
Politics of Reform: Nationalism and Empire after the War 
Postcolonial historiography tends to minimize imperial influences in Indian political 
development while privileging the agency of Indian actors. As a result, this 
historiography tends to igno e aspects of Indian history that reveal the complicity of 
Indian actors in imperial projects. Engaging again with articulations of imperial 
loyalty during the First World War is useful in examining the nature of Britain’s 
cultural imprint on westernized Indian elites acting as intermediaries between the 
colonial state and Indian society. Further, by focusing on supra-national connections 
this article shows the impact such connections had on the ability to sustain the British 
empire during a moment of imperial crisis by facilitating redistribution of resources 
from the Indian colonial economy to the imperial war effort. It assesses the changing 
political meaning of a colony’s ‘contribution’ to a distant conflict; the preponderance 
of the metropolitan press in reconfiguring key ideological underpinnings of colonial 
politics and economic control and how the outbreak of the war was viewed in colonial 
politics and the wider imperial context. 
The British press had celebrated concrete manifestations of Indian loyalty to the 
empire in the form of contributions of men and material during the early phases of the 
war. The rhetoric of loyalty used for this contribution did not permit any discussion of 
the constitutional arrangements for dividing the costs of military campaigns. This 
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rhetoric ignored that the division of the costs of the campaign for the defence of the 
empire between the Indian colony and the British metropole had been a contentious 
part of colonial politics. The use of the Indian army as an imperial gendarme and the 
heavy weight this placed on India’s finances had led to the evolution of an elaborate 
system of checks on India’s military expenditure. In the atmosphere of wartime 
propaganda that spurred the British settler colonies on to greater commitment to the 
war effort, the Northcliffe and Tory press used the rhetoric of colonial contribution for 
imperial defence to characterize India’s financial contribution as having fallen short.  
The scandalous Mesopotamian medical breakdown opened up space for the 
criticism of the Indian government by the British press – marking a turning point in 
British perceptions of colonial rule in India and of the empire in India. As this article 
argues, the Northcliffe and Tory press’s exposé of the scandalous breakdown raised 
questions about the campaign that clearly informed discussions in Parliament and even 
influenced the scope of investigation by the Mesopotamian Commission. Although in 
this exposé of a colonial scandal the medical breakdown loomed large, the one 
concrete consequence of the scandal was not the reform of Indian military medical 
care but rather the increased financial burden of the war on the Indian exchequer.
 226
  
British newspapers, reflecting an increasing focus on rallying the British public and 
empire towards a sacrifice of resources (rather than men) to win the war, demanded an 
increased Indian financial commitment to the war with only a superficial interest in 
reforming colonial finances or the medical arrangements for the Indian army. Instead, 
despite declarations by the viceroy and finance member that India had been ‘bled 
white’ by its contributions to the war effort, the British press sought to increase India’s 
 
226
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contribution to imperial defence. The nationalist press in India stridently criticized 
such demands, by contending that government expenditure on imperial defence would 
further marginalize schemes to ‘develop’ India.
227
 
Despite Chamberlain’s exhortations against transforming the parliamentary debate 
on the Mesopotamian breakdown into a re-evaluation of the entire system of Indian 
government, calls to initiate constitutional reforms were made by liberal politicians 
like Montagu and liberal newspapers like the Manchester Guardian.
228
 As 
Chamberlain’s successor in the India Office, Montagu’s drive for substantial 
constitutional reform was accepted in Britain largely due to the persistent criticism of 
the Indian government in the British press after the Mesopotamian debacle. Within 
India, attacks from the Tory press had also led to a shift, with the dashing of Indian 
nationalist hopes that contribution to the British war effort would introduce Indian 
self-government and earn India a status within the empire similar to the settler 
colonies. The extension of war time restrictions on political protests through the 
Rowlatt Act and the Jallianwala Bagh massacre led to a growing realization of illiberal 
and racist conceptions of empire. Efforts by the colonial government to appease 
criticism of the British press increased the economic burden of war for the Indian 
population and were clearly responsible for the groundswell of popular protests during 
the Rowlatt Satyagraha (1919) and the Non-Cooperation movement (1921-2).
229
  
By focusing exclusively on British/imperial politics, the historiographies of the 
British press, of British wartime propaganda and the Mesopotamian campaign ignore 
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the inter-relatedness of colonial, metropolitan and imperial politics and therefore 
systematically ignore the implications of the Mesopotamian breakdown for South 
Asian history. That the Tory or Northcliffe press, with their imperial sympathies, were 
unwilling to take into account the burden of the war effort on colonial subjects can be 
countenanced, but the neglect by First World War historiography of Indian 
perspectives and the colonial context is far more problematic. By bringing into a 
single frame of analysis the British press’s critique of the Mesopotamian medical 
breakdown and the implications of it for India; and by juxtaposing discussions of 
Indian loyalism during the war with nationalist and imperial critiques of India’s 
contribution, the interplay of newly emerging Indian nationalism with supra-national 
British patriotism within the empire can be revealed. Such an approach reveals the 
imperial fault lines exposed by India’s participation in the First World War. 
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